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USING THE MASTER’S TOOL TO DISMANTLE HIS HOUSE: 
DERRICK BELL, HERBERT WECHSLER,  
AND CRITICAL LEGAL PROCESS 
 Will Rhee* 
This Article retells the life stories of Derrick Bell, a founder of 
Critical Race Theory, and Herbert Wechsler, a founder of the Legal Process 
School, to suggest a synthesis of their often conflicting paradigms—Critical 
Legal Process. Critical Legal Process’s fundamental question is whether the 
Master’s tool, the so-called rule of law, can be considered—in the words of 
Wechsler’s most famous article—a genuine “neutral principle.” Can the 
Master’s favorite tool be repurposed to dismantle the very house it built? Can 
the same rule of law that was abused to build the racist Jim Crow system not 
only dismantle that explicitly racist system but also lessen further racism 
moving forward? Bell would answer “No.” Wechsler would answer with a 
resounding “Yes.” 
Bell and Wechsler offer merging and mirror images of Critical Legal 
Process’s critique of the rule of law. Both famously criticized Brown v. Board 
of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court opinion popularly celebrated for 
catalyzing the dismantling of the American apartheid system. Both began 
their respective legal careers as insider liberal civil rights reformers. Both 
served as federal civil government lawyers in the U.S. Department of Justice. 
When asked to renounce his two-dollar membership in the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Bell refused and left 
Justice. Rejecting Bell’s uncompromising approach, Wechsler 
unapologetically and successfully argued Korematsu, the infamous U.S. 
Supreme Court case that upheld the World War II internment of Japanese-
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Americans.  
Although Bell later renounced his insider status to become an 
outsider protester who rejected the rule of law, Wechsler maintained his 
steadfast belief in incremental, insider liberal legal reform to improve the 
rule of law. Bell’s own fictitious story about a lawyer named Erika Wechsler, 
the daughter of a liberal civil rights law professor, and her White Citizens 
for Black Survival organization, proposes how Critical Legal Process could 
synthesize Bell’s critical deconstructive and Wechsler’s transformative 
reconstructive legacies of the rule of law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article retells the life stories of Derrick Bell, a founder of 
Critical Race Theory,1 and Herbert Wechsler, a founder of the Legal Process 
School,2 to suggest a synthesis of their often conflicting paradigms—Critical 
Legal Process.3 As a “Critical” movement, Critical Legal Process argues that, 
in every democracy, there is a privileged, ruling elite class who seeks to 
maintain the status quo. Audre Lorde elegantly articulated one view of this 
elite: 
Those of us who stand outside the circle of this society’s 
definition of acceptable . . . those of us who have been forged 
in the crucible of difference . . . know that . . . the master’s 
tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They may allow 
us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will 
never enable us to bring about genuine change.4 
Consistent with Lorde’s words,5 this Article shall refer to that ruling 
elite as the “Master.”6 Critical Legal Process also argues that the Master’s 
                                                 
1 Derrick Albert Bell was born on November 6, 1930, and died on October 5, 2011. The Early 
Years: The Making of the Intellectual and the Activist, DERRICK BELL OFFICIAL SITE, 
 http://professorderrickbell.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2018). 
2 Herbert Wechsler died on April 26, 2000. Henry Paul Monaghan, A Legal Giant Is Dead, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1370, 1370 (2000). 
3 See infra Part IV for further discussion. Critical Legal Process follows in the footsteps of 
other critical jurisprudential hybrids such as Critical Race Realism and Critical Race 
 Feminism. See generally DERRICK BELL, CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien 
 Katherine Wing, ed., 1997); CRITICAL RACE REALISM: INTERSECTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY, 
RACE, AND LAW (Gregory S. Parks et al. eds., 2008). 
As Angela Harris astutely observed, “A beginning word of caution: essays like this one 
inevitably indulge in the anthropomorphic fallacy, creating a unified thinking and speaking 
subject where none exists.” Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of 
 Reconstruction, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 741, 744 (1994). As a hybrid of critical theory and the  
so-called Legal Process School, Critical Legal Process assumes consensus over what  
constitutes critical theory and the Legal Process School. Although oversimplified,  
jurisprudential labels nevertheless do make theoretical concepts easier to understand and  
provide convenient shorthand for analysis. 
4 AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 112 (1996); accord DERRICK A. BELL, Bluebeard’s  
Castle: An American Fairy Tale, in AFROLANTICA LEGACIES 157–58 (1998) (analogizing  
U.S. racism against black Americans to the French fairy tale Bluebeard’s Castle); see also  
Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Toolkit--Fit to Dismantle That Famous House?, 75 N.Y.U.  
L. REV. 283, 286–87 (2000) (recognizing Bell’s analogy to Bluebeard’s Castle). 
5 LORDE, supra note 4. 
6 See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African 
American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed “Los Angeles,” 66 S. CAL. L.  
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favorite tool to reinforce its power and privilege is the rule of law—the “often 
used but difficult to define”7 bedrock assumption of classical liberal 
democracy that everyone is equally subject to an objective, fair, publicly 
promulgated written law.8 That written law, the “Master’s house,” is legal 
doctrine—the black-letter law in the books employed daily by lawmakers to 
keep a democracy functioning.9 Legal doctrine is what is taught in traditional 
law school courses and tested on the Bar examination.10 
Bell and Wechsler offer merging and mirror images of Critical Legal 
Process’s critique of the rule of law. Both famously criticized11 Brown v. 
Board of Education,12 the U.S. Supreme Court opinion still popularly 
celebrated as a triumph of the rule of law for catalyzing the dismantling of 
the American apartheid system.13 Both began their respective legal careers as 
insider liberal civil rights reformers.14 Both served as government lawyers in 
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).15 When asked to renounce his $2 
membership in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP), Bell refused and left the DOJ.16 Rejecting Bell’s 
uncompromising approach, Wechsler unapologetically and successfully 
argued Korematsu, the infamous U.S. Supreme Court case17 that upheld the 
World War II internment of Japanese-Americans.18 
Although Bell later renounced his insider status to become an outsider 
                                                 
REV. 1581, 1582 (1993) (“I use ‘master narrative’ to describe white supremacy’s  
prescriptive, conflict-constructing power, which deploys exclusionary concepts of race and  
privilege in ways that maintain intergroup conflict.”) (footnote omitted). 
7 Part 1: What is the Rule of Law, A.B.A. DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC. 4, https://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/Part1DialogueROL.authcheckdam.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2017). 
8 Will Rhee, Law and Practice, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 273, 293–94 (2012). 
9 Id. at 294. 
10 Id. 
11 Bell and Wechsler both published their critiques of Brown in the Harvard Law Review. 
See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
12 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), enforced, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 
294 (1955). See infra notes 63–69, 333–85, and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra Parts II.A and III.A. 
15 See infra notes 101–07, 268–312, and accompanying text. 
16 See infra Part II.A. 
17 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
18 Id. 
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protester who rejected the rule of law,19 Wechsler maintained his steadfast 
belief in incremental, insider liberal legal reform to improve the rule of law.20 
Wechsler’s proudest achievement, the American Law Institute’s Model Penal 
Code,21 remains perhaps the greatest example of such incremental insider 
reform.22 
As explained in Part I, Critical Legal Process’s fundamental question 
remains whether the so-called rule of law can be considered—in the words 
of Wechsler’s most famous article—a genuine “neutral principle.”23 Can the 
Master’s favorite tool be repurposed to dismantle the very house it built? Can 
the same rule of law the Master used to build the racist Jim Crow system later 
serve to dismantle that system and lessen further racism in the future? Bell 
would answer “No.” Wechsler would answer with a resounding “Yes.” 24 
In Part II, Bell’s life story chronicles how he came to believe that only 
the Master can control the rule of law. Although Bell agrees with Lorde that 
the Master’s favorite tool will never dismantle his house, Bell does so 
unwillingly, wistfully wishing that he could believe again in insider legal 
reform.25 Despite Bell’s uncompromising criticism of legal doctrine, his legal 
narratives are nevertheless full of hypothetical legal doctrine.26 Conceding 
his proposed legal doctrine’s radicalism, Bell never expected policymakers 
to take his hypothetical legal doctrine seriously.27 Instead, the primary 
purpose of Bell’s legal doctrine was critical deconstruction.28 He used this 
vehicle to express his views satirically, more like a thought experiment 
intended to help the Master see another point of view rather than to trigger 
genuine legal reform. 
Although Wechsler agreed with Bell that the Master’s favorite tool 
had built the Master’s house, as explained in Part III, the clear purpose of 
                                                 
19 See infra Part II.C. 
20 See infra Part III. 
21 THE AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT AND EXPLANATORY NOTES 
(1965); see infra notes 422–26 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 422–24 and accompanying text. 
23 See generally Wechsler, supra note 11. 
24 See infra Parts II and III. 
25 See infra Part II.B. 
26 See infra notes 145–77 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 143–44 and accompanying text. 
28 Derrick A. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 899 
(1995). (emphasis added). 
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Wechsler’s proposed legal doctrine was the transformative reconstruction29 
of flawed legal doctrine for genuine, albeit imperfect, legal reform. 
Like Bell, Wechsler also authored hypothetical legal doctrine, but did 
so from his position as a respected legal insider.30 Whereas Bell’s 
hypothetical legal doctrine lay embedded in his fictional critical race 
stories,31 Wechsler’s hypothetical legal doctrine was published by the 
preeminent blue chip legal think tank, the American Law Institute (ALI).32 
Unlike Bell, however, Wechsler not only expected the Master to take his 
hypothetical legal doctrine seriously, but also witnessed the Master 
celebrating and officially adopting it during Wechsler’s legal career.33 
Finally, in Part IV, this Article employs Bell’s own fanciful story 
about a lawyer named Erika Wechsler, the daughter of a liberal civil rights 
law professor,34 and her White Citizens for Black Survival organization,35 to 
propose how Critical Legal Process could synthesize Bell’s critical 
deconstructive and Weschler’s transformative reconstructive legacies of the 
rule of law.36 
I. THE MASTER’S FAVORITE TOOL IS THE RULE OF LAW 
The Master’s favorite tool, the means by which privileged, entrenched 
elites maintain their power, is the rule of law.37 A democratic government 
uses the rule of law, backed by the government’s coercive force, to compel 
                                                 
29 Id. (emphasis added). 
30 See infra Part III. 
31 See infra notes 143–44 and accompanying text. 
32 The American Law Institute bills itself as “the leading independent organization in the 
United States producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and improve the law.” About  
ALI, ALI, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2018). Chief Justice Berger 
concurred, stating that the ALI under Wechsler’s leadership was “at the forefront of 
improvement in American Law.” Warren E. Burger, Dedication, Herbert Wechsler, 78 
COLUM. L. REV. 951, 951 (1978). 
33 See infra Part III.B. 
34 Derrick Bell, Divining a Racial Realism Theory, in FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: 
THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 91–92 (1992). 
35 Id. at 93. 
36 See infra Part IV. 
37 This assumption underpinned the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement. CLS’s 
“central descriptive message” is “that legal ideals are manipulable and that law serves to 
legitimate existing maldistributions of wealth and power.” Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the 
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBR. L. REV. 
323, 327 (1987). See also ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
MOVEMENT: ANOTHER TIME, A GREATER TASK 52–56 (Verso 2015) (1983). 
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its citizens to obey the Master’s house: legal doctrine.38 Citizens who do not 
comply face state-enforced monetary penalties, physical harm, or 
incarceration.39 
The rule of law, however, is not the only tool in the Master’s toolkit. 
Oligarchic and dictatorial Masters have long eschewed the rule of law for the 
rule of people,40 where the lawmaker’s unfettered personal discretion 
regulated human behavior.41 One of the supposed hallmarks of the rule of 
law, however, is that no one is supposed to be above the rule of law.42 
A. A Tool for All or Only the Master? 
The rule of law’s claim to neutrality and objectivity that transcends, 
or at least cabins, a lawmaker’s individual discretion remains one of its most 
fundamental and appealing attributes. In the Massachusetts Constitution, 
John Adams famously declared “a government of laws and not of men.”43 
Thomas Paine in Common Sense concurred: “For as in absolute governments 
the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought 
to be no other.”44 More cynically, Antole France quipped “majestic equality 
of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to 
beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.”45 Today, the American Bar 
Association’s (ABA) Rule of Law Initiative seeks to promote the so-called 
rule of law throughout the world.46 Founded by a past ABA President,47 the 
World Justice Project annually calculates an empirical Rule of Law ranking 
                                                 
38 In this Article’s extended analogy, if the rule of law is the Master’s tool, that tool is used 
to build the Master’s house—legal doctrine. 
39 As Robert Cover famously observed, “Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the 
imposition of violence upon others . . . .” Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE 
L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986); see also Richard Delgado, Law’s Violence: Derrick Bell’s Next 
Article, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 435, 437 (2014). 
40 Rhee, supra note 8, at 292 n.121. 
41 See, e.g., William C. Whitford, The Rule of Law, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 723, 724 (2000). 
42 Id. 
43 MASS. CONST., Part The First, art. XXX. 
44 THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in COMMON SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS 32 
(Nelson F. Adkins, ed., The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1953) (emphasis in original). 
45 ANTOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Winifred Stephens trans., 7th ed. 1922). 
46 ABA Rule of Law Initiative, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law 
.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).  
47 About Us, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2018) (stating that the Project was “[f]ounded by William H. Neukom in 2006 as a 
presidential initiative of the American Bar Association . . . .”). 
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of nations.48 
The rule of law and its primary product, legal doctrine, are supposed 
to trump the rule of people. Whether or not the rule of law actually does so, 
however, is one of the key disagreements not only between Bell and Wechsler 
but also within Critical Legal Process.49 Although Wechsler conceded that 
legal doctrine “is intrinsically uncertain and unclear” and “is shaped as it is 
applied,”50 he nevertheless believed that legal objectivity was a worthy goal 
and that legal doctrine could be perfected to be more objective. 51 He claimed: 
Objectivity is more or less possible for individuals and courts 
and agencies and people and professors and lawyers. I think a 
degree of objectivity is obtainable. . . . [W]e should be as 
objective as we can be. It is not true that objectivity is 
impossible, and it is not true, unfortunately, that it is ever 
perfectly attained.52 
Wechsler’s goal for legal doctrine was, quoting Max Radin, “[a] juster 
justice, a more lawful law.”53 
  To Wechsler, essential to the never-ending pursuit of legal objectivity 
was focusing on law’s means—or process—as opposed to its ends—or 
motives—because such ends ultimately are subjective value choices: 
[W]hat is likely to be unclear is whether the ultimate 
propositions in ethics and politics, those which concern ends 
rather than means, can reasonably be asserted as anything 
more than . . . personal preference. If they can only be asserted 
as . . . personal preference, it is impossible to evaluate law and 
legal activity on any other ground than their conformity to the 
                                                 
48 What is the Rule of Law?, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-
us/overview/what-rule-law (last visited Feb. 9, 2018). The United States was ranked 19th 
overall out of 113 countries. United States, WORLD JUST. PROJECT: RULE OF LAW INDEX 
2017-2018, http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#/groups/USA (last visited Feb. 6, 2018). For 
fundamental rights, the United States was ranked 26th out of 113 countries. Id. 
49 See infra notes 143–46, 333–54, and accompanying text. 
50 HERBERT WECHSLER, Some Issues for the Lawyer, in INTEGRITY AND COMPROMISE: 
PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONSCIENCE 119 (Robert M. MacIver ed., 1957). 
51 Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward “Neutral Principles” in the Law: Selections 
From the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 854, 929–30 (1993). 
52 Id. 
53 Max Radin, A Juster Justice, A More Lawful Law, in LEGAL ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO ORRIN 
KIP MCMURRAY 537 (Max Radin & A. M. Kidd eds., 1935). 
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personal desires of the individual who makes the judgment.54 
In opposition, Bell ultimately rejected Wechsler’s means–ends distinction 
as a false dichotomy. To Bell, legal doctrine’s ends were what really 
mattered. As a Critical Race Theorist,55 Bell ignored Wechsler’s still-
popular view that legal doctrine “should be objective and not take sides” 
by asserting that “racism is both wrong and the greatest barrier to 
                                                 
54 JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION: 
CASES, STATUTES AND COMMENTARIES 5 (1940). Wechsler and his co-author Michael also 
favorably quoted economist Paul Sweezy to assert that arguing over subjective ends was 
counterproductive: “Underlying conceptions of good and evil, it has been frequently 
observed, do not constitute a fruitful subject of controversy. These are matters of taste which 
it is best to leave for the individual to work out for himself as best he can.” Id. at 5 n.5. 
(quoting Paul M. Sweezy, Leviathan and the People, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1064, 1064 (1940) 
(book review)). Wechsler considered Jerome Michael, another Professor at Columbia Law 
School, an extremely influential mentor. Silber & Miller, supra note 51, at 863. Michael had 
taught Wechsler as a law student. Id. Wechsler and Michael co-authored Criminal Law and 
Its Administration, one of the most influential American criminal law casebooks. Louis B. 
Schwartz, The Wechslerian Revolution in Criminal Law and Administration, 78 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1159, 1159 (1978). In his memorial to his “anti-positivist” friend a year before Brown 
was decided, Wechsler articulated Michael’s belief that principles could transcend legal 
doctrine and that legal knowledge was significant only if it brought true understanding: 
For . . . Michael was above all else a man of principle . . . and he devoted 
a large portion of his energy to the refinement and articulation of the 
principles that he avowed. . . . [He believed that] practice when it is 
unprincipled is not alone incompetent—it is anarchical; that principle or 
theory is, in this dimension, the communicable formulation of what 
practice is about: its ends and means, its possibilities and difficulties, all 
grasped through understanding the processes involved. . . . At all events, 
he . . . [knew] that what law needs is more and better theory: for its making, 
for its application, for its teaching and its practice. 
. . .  
[H]is vision of a legal subject had a scope far wider than the statement and 
arrangement of existing law . . . and if the statement was confined to formal 
rules he thought it very close to useless information. Such knowledge had 
significance for him only if it was accompanied by understanding. And 
understanding meant a deep appreciation of the problems that it is law’s 
function to solve, the ends that should be sought in their solution and the 
means that are adapted to such ends. 
Herbert Wechsler et. al., Jerome Michael, 1890-1953, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 301, 301–02 
(1953). 
55 Starting with the Critical Legal Studies movement, many critical jurisprudential  
movements have critiqued legal doctrine’s indeterminacy or masqueraded enforcement of 
the status quo. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 46–60 (1988). 
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realization of the nation’s often pledged but seldom realized ideals.”56 By 
their actions, if not by their words, both Bell and Wechsler opposed the 
Jim Crow apartheid system as racist and evil. 
B.         Building the Master’s House. 
As the legal doctrine of Jim Crow segregation demonstrated, and both 
Bell and Wechsler agreed, the rule of law has indisputably been used in the 
United States to build the white supremacist Master’s house. As early as 
1934, Wechsler condemned the so-called rule of law’s acquiescence to the 
unaccountable white mob lynchings of blacks.57 Three years later, he helped 
represent a black Communist criminal defendant in front of the U.S. Supreme 
Court.58 Bell called Wechsler “a frequent advocate for civil rights causes.”59 
Bell of course dedicated his entire life to opposing the explicit and implicit 
racism he saw in legal doctrine.60 
C.        Dismantling the Master’s House? 
Despite their well-documented opposition to Jim Crow apartheid, 
both Bell and Wechsler nonetheless dared criticize that heroic legal talisman, 
Brown v. Board of Education,61 lionized in an avalanche of scholarship and 
                                                 
56 DERRICK BELL & JOY RADICE, TEACHER’S MANUAL: RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 
5 (6th ed. 2008) (on file with the Concordia Law Review). 
57 See generally Herbert Wechsler, Book Review 44 YALE L.J. 191 (1934) (reviewing JAMES 
HARMON CHADBOURN, LYNCHING AND THE LAW (1933) & ARTHUR FRANKLIN RAPER, THE 
TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING (1933)). Even in 1934, Wechsler believed that law reform could and 
must improve blacks’ Jim Crow oppression: 
But the negro who succumbs to his terror must acquiesce in all the other 
injustices perpetrated on his race, a result which should be abhorrent to the 
dominant citizens of a civilized state. Whether he succumbs or not, it is 
difficult to call him unreasonable if he embraces the conviction, shared by 
many of his fellows, that his road to justice reaches beyond existing 
governmental institutions. . . . It can be dispelled only by the creation of a 
more abundant life for the negro . . . to make possible such a life is the job 
of government. 
Id. at 192 (footnote omitted). 
58 See generally Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935); see also supra notes 267–68 and 
accompanying text. 
59 Bell, supra note 11, at 519. 
60 See, e.g., Margalynne J. Armstrong & Stephanie M. Wildman, An Homage to Derrick Bell, 
36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. v, v–vi (2013). 
61 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), enforced, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 
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popular acclaim.62 More than sixty years later, Brown is still credited with 
symbolically,63 if not substantively,64 dismantling the Master’s Jim Crow 
house. Whereas Wechsler essentially criticized Brown for placing ends over 
means,65 Bell criticized Brown because it reinforced the false belief that the 
rule of law or any other means could ever change the United States’ 
permanently racist ends.66 
After becoming disillusioned with the rule of law’s unfulfilled 
promises, Bell came to agree with Lorde that the rule of law could never be 
used to dismantle the Master’s house.67 Like many critical jurisprudential 
movements, Bell concluded that the rule of law was the Master’s favorite tool 
precisely because its powerful myth of neutrality, objectivity, and legalism 
cleverly camouflaged the Master’s actual oppression.68 One of Bell’s seminar 
students summarized Lorde’s point so well that Bell later published it.69 She 
articulated a “self-protectionism” theory, wherein the Master “structure[s] 
distribution of power and resources to protect [his] own social status and 
control.”70 This self-protectionism theory, she posited, is at the heart of many 
forms of discrimination, including racism.71 Bell’s most famous 
manifestation of the self-protection theory is his pessimistic Racial Realism 
Rule: 
[R]acism is not going to go away. Rather, racism is an integral, 
permanent, and indestructible component of this society. 
Because this is true . . . [b]lack people will never achieve full 
                                                 
294 (1955). 
62 See Matthew E. K. Hall, Bringing Down Brown: Super Precedents, Myths of Rediscovery, 
and the Retroactive Canonization of Brown v. Board of Education, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 655, 
659–60 (2010); see generally MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES OF  
AMERICA’S EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK 6 (2010) (describing the desegregation effects of  
Brown on the education system). 
63 See Jim Hilbert, Restoring the Promise of Brown: Using State Constitutional Law to 
Challenge School Segregation, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 5 (2017). 
64 Id. 
65 Wechsler, supra note 11, at 26–27. 
66 Bell, supra note 11, at 519. 
67 See Rhee, supra note 8, at 292. 
68 Id. 
69 Derrick A. Bell et al., Racial Reflections: Dialogues in the Direction of Liberation, 37  
UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1047–49 (1990) (referring to “Scapegoats for Self-Protection” by  
Suzanne Goldberg). 
70 Id. at 1048. 
71 Id. 
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equality in this country. . . . Even those . . . successful [efforts] 
will produce no more than temporary “peaks of progress,” 
short-lived [periods of improved conditions] that slide into 
irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white 
dominance.72 
Bell’s permanent racism thesis predictably “provoked cries of outrage and 
condemnation as being too cynical.”73 Although these skeptics considered 
Bell’s radical deconstruction unpersuasive, they might still be receptive 
to Wechsler’s transformative reconstruction.74 
By accepting racism’s permanence, Bell finds transformative 
reconstruction of legal doctrine to be impossible. His critical deconstruction 
of legal doctrine, however, might improve black conditions, remind the 
Master that blacks are willing to fight, and provide blacks with meaning and 
hope through future struggle.75 
                                                 
72 Derrick Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis: Courageous Revelation or Unconscious 
Denial of Racial Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 571, 573 (1993) (quoting DERRICK A. BELL, 
FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 12 (1992)). Bell 
frequently cites Jennifer Hochschild’s reexamination of Gunnar Myrdal’s famous “anomaly 
thesis” in The American Dilemma. Id. at 577. Myrdal believed that “[r]acism was simply an 
anomaly in a society committed to equality, the reparable failure of liberal democratic 
practices to coincide with liberal democratic theory . . . .” Bell, supra note 69, at 1051. 
Hochschild reexamined Myrdal’s anomaly thesis and concluded that “[L]iberal democracy 
and racism in the United States are historically, even inherently, reinforcing; American 
society as we know it exists only because of its foundation in racially based slavery, and it 
thrives only because racial discrimination continues. The apparent anomaly is an actual 
symbiosis.” JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 5 (1984). 
73 THE DERRICK BELL READER 8 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2005). 
74 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
75 Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 378 (1992). 
While implementing Racial Realism we must simultaneously 
acknowledge that our actions are not likely to lead to transcendent change 
and, despite our best efforts, may be of more help to the system we despise 
than to the victims of that system we are trying to help. Nevertheless, our 
realization, and the dedication based on that realization, can lead to policy 
positions and campaigns that are less likely to worsen conditions for those 
we are trying to help, and will be more likely to remind those in power that 
there are imaginative, unabashed risk-takers who refuse to be trammeled 
upon. Yet confrontation with our oppressors is not our sole reason for 
engaging in Racial Realism. Continued struggle can bring about 
unexpected benefits and gains that in themselves justify continued 
endeavor. The fight in itself has meaning and should give us hope for the 
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II. DERRICK BELL’S CRITICAL DECONSTRUCTION OF LEGAL DOCTRINE 
“Bell has pioneered at least three areas of scholarship: critical race 
theory, narrative scholarship, and economic-determinist analysis of racial 
history.”76 Throughout his legal career, Derrick Bell had a tragic romance 
with the Master’s tool—the rule of law—and the Master’s house, legal 
doctrine.77 As a young law student and crusading civil rights lawyer, Bell 
accepted classical liberalism’s faith in the rule of law.78 Like many civil rights 
lawyers of his time, he initially considered Brown v. Board of Education to 
be the rule of law’s penultimate triumph.79 But as he attempted to enforce 
Brown’s legal doctrine upon recalcitrant, defiant school districts, Bell became 
a disillusioned liberal. In the end, he saw the rule of law as an abuser that 
took far more than it could give.80 
Ultimately, Bell walked away from the rule of law. 81 He abandoned 
incremental, insider legal reform as hopeless and instead embraced his 
longstanding role as the perpetual outsider protester.82 Nevertheless, as Bell 
admitted in interviews and demonstrated in his narrative dialogues with 
supernatural civil rights lawyer Geneva Crenshaw,83 he continued to yearn 
for the rule of law.84 
Through hypothetical legal doctrine, Bell had his cake and ate it too. 
As legal doctrine, it humored his continuing infatuation with the rule of law. 
As a thought experiment, it also allowed him hypothetically to assume an 
explicit acknowledgment of American racism and American white self-
                                                 
future. 
Id. 
76 DERRICK BELL READER, supra note 73, at 14. One of his famous short stories, “Space 
 Traders,” even became a 1994 HBO movie. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Space Traders for 
the Twenty-First Century, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 49, 57 n.46 (2009). 
77 See infra Part II.A. 
78 See infra Part II.A. 
79 See infra Part II.A; see also DERRICK BELL READER, supra note 73, at 4 (stating that 
“Brown remained Holy Writ”). 
80 See infra notes 142–46 and accompanying text. 
81 See Rhee, supra note 8, at 292. 
82 See infra Part II.C. 
83 Geneva Crenshaw represents the many strong black women Bell has known throughout 
his life. DERRICK BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES 83 (1998). See also infra note 160 and 
accompanying text. 
84 See infra Part II.B. 
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protectionism,85 which Bell himself admitted was unlikely in real life.86 
Finally, Bell’s hypothetical legal doctrine remains a masterful example of 
Critical Legal Process’s critical deconstruction of legal doctrine. 87 
A.         Disillusioned Classical Liberal to Outsider Protester 
Bell entered the University of Pittsburgh School of Law in 1954, 88 
the year the U.S. Supreme Court issued its celebrated Brown I opinion.89 He 
graduated in 1957, the only black student in his 140-student class and one of 
only three black students in the entire school.90 Before law school, he had 
literally soldiered for the United States as an Air Force lieutenant from 1952–
54.91 While a law student, he was an associate editor of the University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review.92 Richard Thornburgh, future Republican Attorney 
General and Governor of Pennsylvania, was one of Bell’s fellow editors.93 
Despite their ideological differences, they remained cordial for the rest of 
their lives.94 
All of Bell’s early articles exhibited masterful analysis of legal 
doctrine.95 Throughout law school, he believed “that the Brown decision 
marked the beginning of the end of Jim Crow oppression in all its myriad 
forms.”96 Bell submitted so much writing on racial issues that the Law 
Review’s faculty advisor asked him whether he wanted to change the Law 
                                                 
85 See infra notes 154–87 and accompanying text. 
86 See, e.g., Eric Ilhyung Lee, Nomination of Derrick A. Bell, Jr. to be an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Chronicles of a Civil Rights Activist, 22 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 363 (1995) (imagining how the U.S. Senate would react to Bell’s hypothetical 
legal doctrine during Supreme Court confirmation hearings); see also infra notes 153–54 and 
accompanying text. 
87 See Bell, supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
88 See DERRICK BELL OFFICIAL SITE, supra note 1. 
89 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.483 (1954). 
90 See DERRICK BELL OFFICIAL SITE, supra note 1. 
91 See Id. 
92 Janet Dewart Bell, In Memory of Professor Derrick Bell, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. i, i (2013). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Girard Will Case—a Charitable Trust Faces the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 18 U. PITT. L. REV. 620 (1957); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Pennsylvania 
Fair Employment Practice Act, 17 U. PITT. L. REV. 438 (1956); T. Oscar Smith & Derrick 
A. Bell, The Conscientious-Objector Program—A Search for Sincerity, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 
695 (1958). 
96 DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 2 (2004). 
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Review’s name to the University of Pittsburgh Civil Rights Journal.97 
Upon meeting his hero, the first black federal judge, Judge William 
H. Hastie, Bell told Hastie that he wanted to become a civil rights lawyer.98 
Reflecting the naïveté of early civil rights advocates still reveling in Brown, 
Hastie replied, “Son, I am afraid that you were born fifteen years too late to 
have a career in civil rights.”99 After Brown’s issuance, Bell’s future NAACP 
boss Thurgood Marshall reportedly said that it would take about five years to 
implement Brown and that all racial segregation would be eliminated by 
1963.100 “For the first decade of my legal career,” wrote Bell, “I, like most 
civil professionals, believed with an almost religious passion that the Brown 
decision was the equivalent of the Holy Grail of racial justice.”101 
Despite Judge Hastie’s admonition, Bell became a civil rights lawyer 
out of law school.102 Selected for the prestigious DOJ Honors Program, he 
transferred a year later to the new Civil Rights Division.103 In a formalist 
move, of which Herbert Wechsler might approve,104 Bell’s superiors asked 
Bell to end his $2 NAACP membership.105 His superiors probably recognized 
that the NAACP was a private advocacy organization that was often a party 
in Civil Rights Division cases. Because Bell, as a DOJ attorney, represented 
the United States’ interests—and not any particular interest group—in federal 
court, Bell’s superiors presumably and understandably believed such 
membership would appear to be a conflict of interest, indicative of a possible 
lack of neutrality or objectivity.106 Even though the DOJ and NAACP had 
often worked together in early civil rights cases, they would go on to oppose 
each other in federal court in the future.107 
                                                 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 3. 
99 Id. 
100 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HALLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 
43 (1991). 
101 BELL, supra note 96, at 3. 
102 Id. 
103 See DERRICK BELL OFFICIAL SITE, supra note 1. 
104 See infra Part III.B. 
105 DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER 18 
(1994). 
106 Id. 
107 See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Clifford Freed, 
Ethical Considerations for the Justice Department When It Switches Sides During Litigation, 
7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 405 (1984). 
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Wechsler probably would have cancelled his membership to maintain the 
formal appearance of neutrality. Because of his penchant for not inquiring 
into motives or specific circumstances when determining neutrality,108 
Wechsler might analogize Bell’s NAACP membership to another DOJ 
attorney’s membership in a white supremacist organization. To Bell, 
however, motives and circumstances mattered.109 Starting a pugnacious 
pattern of protest that would characterize his entire legal career,110 Bell 
refused to cancel his NAACP membership.111 As a result, Bell’s supervisors 
moved Bell’s desk out of his office into the hallway and reduced his 
caseload.112 Rather than renounce his NAACP membership, Bell resigned 
from the DOJ.113 
After leaving the DOJ, Bell worked for the local Pittsburgh chapter 
of the NAACP.114 Thurgood Marshall, then-Director of the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund (LDF), met Bell in Pittsburgh.115 Having heard about Bell’s 
DOJ resignation, Marshall offered Bell a job to work with him at the LDF. 
Bell “accepted on the spot.”116 From 1960 to 1966, Bell supervised more than 
300 LDF school desegregation cases.117 At the LDF, he worked with Medgar 
Evers (up until his murder), Thurgood Marshall, Jack Greenberg, Robert 
Carter, and Constance Baker Motley.118 
Foreshadowing his future identity as a perpetual protester, in 1961, 
Bell mistakenly made a public telephone call in a whites-only railroad station 
waiting room in Jackson, Mississippi.119 White police officers arrested him 
and put him in jail overnight.120 Fortunately, a local black lawyer bailed him 
                                                 
108 See WECHSLER, supra note 50. 
109 For example, with his Race, Racism, and American Law casebook, Bell rejected “the view 
that law school texts should be objective and not take sides. Rather, the book’s point of 
departure is that racism is both wrong and the greatest barrier to realization of the nation’s 
often pledged but seldom realized ideals.” BELL & RADICE, supra note 56. 
110 See infra Part II.C. 








119 DERRICK BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION: LIVING A LIFE OF MEANING AND WORTH 30 (2002). 
120 Id. 
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out the next day.121 When Bell returned to LDF headquarters in New York, 
Thurgood Marshall prophetically lectured Bell: “Damn, boy, the black folks 
down South need good lawyering. They don’t need dead heroes. They got 
plenty of them already. Understand? Do your protesting in the courtroom, 
not in the railroad station.”122 
From 1966 to 1968, Bell continued his school desegregation work as 
Deputy Director, Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (the institutional precursor to the U.S. Department of 
Education).123 Bell started teaching law in 1969, when he began to reflect on 
and write about his school desegregation practice experience.124 He became 
the first Executive Director of the Western Center on Law and Poverty at the 
University of Southern California Law School.125 With the race riots after Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination in 1968, progressive law schools 
scrambled to hire black faculty.126 In 1969, Harvard Law School hired Bell 
to be, as Bell recounted the dean’s words, “the first, but not the last black” 
faculty member.127 
At that time, Bell admitted that he remained a classical liberal, but a 
disillusioned one: 
By this point, my enthusiasm for gaining compliance with 
Brown through court orders requiring the balancing of races 
for each school had waned with experience. Brown remained 
Holy Writ, but I now felt we were misreading its message. As 
happens all too often in religion, disciples lose sight of the 
basic truths amid all the doctrines that tend to stifle those 
truths rather than nourish them.128 
With the benefit of time and space as a law professor to reflect on his 
desegregation practice experience, Bell turned away from his classical liberal 
roots. Of Bell’s many publications, two in particular illustrate his about-face 
from the classical liberal rule of law. In the first article, Serving Two Masters: 
                                                 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 31 (emphasis added). 
123 DERRICK BELL OFFICIAL SITE, supra note 1. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 DERRICK BELL READER, supra note 73, at 5–6. 
127 Id. at 6. 
128 BELL, supra note 96, at 4. 
18      CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW                   Vol. 3 
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 
Bell attacked a classical liberal rule of law stronghold, public interest 
litigation, by accusing public interest legal organizations like the LDF of 
suffering from a conflict of interest in impact litigation.129 Because public 
interest legal organizations ultimately want to change the law, the would-be 
law reformers’ objectives might be different than their actual clients’ 
objectives.130 While impact litigators might want a particular outcome to set-
up the next lawsuit, their clients might prefer more pedestrian relief that better 
improves their lives but does not provide the desired legal precedent.131 
In a published response to Bell’s article, LDF General Counsel 
Nathaniel Jones was furious. He characterized Bell’s “indictment of civil 
rights lawyers (and the NAACP)” as claiming that “civil rights lawyers have 
failed adequately to represent the interests of children in segregated schools 
and thus violated their ethical responsibilities to their clients.”132 Jones 
concluded that Bell’s article lacked “analytical and factual precision” and 
“comprehensiveness.”133 
Although Bell had alienated many of his former civil rights colleagues 
with his first article, his second article ignited a firestorm of opprobrium 
because, like Wechsler before him, Bell dared attack the sanctity of Brown. 
In Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, Bell 
first articulated what would later be known as the Interest-Convergence 
Thesis.134 
The Interest-Convergence Thesis was Bell’s attempt to meet 
Wechsler’s challenge, to articulate Brown’s neutral principle, and to explain 
“on a positivistic level—how the world is.”135 The Interest-Convergence 
Thesis has been applied to a variety of different contexts, including other 
                                                 
129 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in  
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 472–73 (1976). 
130 Id. at 477–78. 
131 Id. at 471–72. 
132 Nathaniel R. Jones, Correspondence: School Desegregation, 86 YALE L.J. 378, 379  
(1976). 
133 Id. at 381. 
134 See generally Bell, supra note 11; see also Kevin Hopkins, Back to Afrolantica: A Legacy 
of (Black) Perseverance?, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 447, 466 (1998) (“No matter 
how justified by the racial injustices they are intended to remedy, civil rights policies, 
including affirmative action, are implemented for blacks only when they further interests of 
whites.”). 
135 Bell, supra note 11, at 523. 
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minority race rights, non-Christian religious rights, educational reform, 
pension reform, animal rights, domestic violence, concentrated poverty, and 
the war on terror.136 A more generic statement of the Thesis might be: a 
capitalist democracy adopts legal doctrine with the express purpose to assist 
marginalized people only if such doctrine actually furthers the Master’s 
interests. 
With his published criticism of Brown and his claim that racism is a 
permanent part of American society,137 Bell had become disillusioned with 
the liberal ideal of the rule of law. Bell later wrote about how traditional rule-
of-law civil rights lawsuits were actually counterproductive: 
We learned the hard way that commitment to white 
dominance could both survive official segregation and gain in 
effectiveness under the equal opportunity standard we civil 
rights lawyers had urged on courts and the country. . . . Thus, 
rather than eliminate racial discrimination, civil rights laws 
have only driven it underground, where it flourishes even 
more effectively. Given the intransigence of discrimination, 
civil rights campaigns aimed at changing the rules, without 
affecting the underlying status quo, have proved 
counterproductive even when their original goals were 
achieved.138 
Although Bell had stopped his earlier romance with the Master’s rule 
of law and the Master’s house, legal doctrine, he remained ambivalent. 
Ironically, his pining for the rule of law and legal doctrine manifested itself 
not in court filings or official legal doctrine but rather through his outsider 
narrative scholarship. 
B.         Lingering Legal Doctrinalist 
Despite his well-established mistrust of the rule of law and legal 
doctrine, Bell nevertheless created hypothetical legal doctrine in his narrative 
stories. He concluded that the rule of law “seeks to convey an objectivity that 
may exist in theory but is impossible in the real world.”139 Likewise, Bell 
                                                 
136 See Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U.L. REV. 149,  
155 (2011). 
137 Bell, supra note 11, at 522–23. 
138 BELL, supra note 105, at 149–50 (emphasis added). 
139 BELL & RADICE, supra note 56, at 11. 
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considered legal doctrine extremely indeterminate, asserting that the 
“instability and malleability of legal doctrine renders certainty a myth and 
stare decisis a fiction.”140 
Yet when writing his modern-day race-law parables, Bell decided to 
continue to explore rule-of-law and legal doctrinal themes. Many of his 
narrative stories involved dialogues between Bell and his supernatural former 
civil rights colleague Geneva Crenshaw, named in honor of “many black 
women [Bell had] known and learned from during [his] life.”141 Bell 
explained that in spite of his skepticism, in his stories, Derrick Bell the 
character would continue to represent the classical liberal rule-of-law 
position, a position Crenshaw was happy to undermine:  
[Geneva Crenshaw] has strange, really sort of superhuman, 
powers of insight with regard to race. I, as the narrator dealing 
with her, take a more conventional civil-rights lawyer 
approach: “We need to continue following litigation,” and she 
tells me that’s crazy. . . . [I]t reflects the ambivalence that—
that I feel and I think that a lot of blacks feel. We’re in this 
transitional era, in which I can’t claim that I’ve totally lost my 
sense that the answer is one more lawsuit and—and one more 
traditional effort to get civil-rights legislation passed.142 
Bell therefore created hypothetical legal doctrine to implement his 
racism-is-permanent neutral principle. He recognized that policymakers 
might not listen to him or care about his doctrinal proposals.143 Like the 
biblical prophet Jeremiah, Bell’s hypothetical legal doctrine served as a 
jeremiad “calling for the nation to repent.”144 Here are some examples of 
                                                 
140 Id. at 14. 
141 BELL, supra note 83, at 83. 
142 Interview by Brian Lamb with Derrick Bell, Author (Nov. 15, 1992), http://www.book 
notes.org/Watch /34630-1/Derrick-Bell.aspx. 
143 See, e.g., BELL, supra note 83, at 33–35 (acknowledging that “it sure is tough trying to 
resist oppression with words and ideas” and that “it’s hard to imagine how more of our 
writings can halt or even hinder the hostile forces arrayed against our people.”). 
144 Bell’s exchange with Geneva Crenshaw in Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The 
Permanence of Racism demonstrated his awareness: 
“In other words,” I [Bell] suggested when she looked up, “we’re a race of 
Jeremiahs, prophets calling for the nation to repent.” “Exactly!” Geneva 
said. “And you know what nations do to their prophets?” “I do. About the 
least dire fate for a prophet is that one preaches, and no one listens; that 
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Bell’s critical deconstructionist legal doctrine (with brief explanations):  
 Interest-Convergence Thesis. As previously explained,145 this thesis 
assumes that the U.S. legal system will adopt legal doctrine ostensibly to 
remedy black injustice only when such doctrine would also further white 
interests.146 
 Revisionist Brown opinion (What Brown Should Have Said). Nine famed 
academics were asked the following: “How would you have written the 
Brown opinion in 1954, if you knew then what you know now about the 
subsequent history of the country and the progress of race relations in the 
past half century?”147 The nine academics simulated the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Not surprisingly, Justice Bell authored a dissenting opinion 
because the “Court’s long-overdue findings that Negroes are harmed by 
racial segregation is, regrettably, unaccompanied by an understanding of 
the economic, political, and psychological advantages whites gain 
because of that harm.”148 
 Racial Fortuity Corollary. Bell later expanded his Interest-Convergence 
Thesis to cover minority groups more broadly where racial minorities are 
only incidental or fortuitous third-party beneficiaries of racial policies, 
without the ability to enforce those policies.149 
 Racial Preference Licensing Act (RPLA) (the Final Civil Rights Act).150 
With the RPLA, the United States, according to Bell, would finally 
acknowledge the reality of de facto discrimination against blacks by 
                                                 
one risks all to speak the truth, and nobody cares.” 
 
Derrick Bell, Racism’s Secret Bonding, in FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE  
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jeremiad. See, e.g., Marcus Bruce, “The Promise of American Life”: Derrick Bell, Critical  
Race Theory, and the American Jeremiad, in FOLKWAYS AND LAW WAYS: LAW IN  
AMERICAN STUDIES 165 (Helle Porsdam ed., 2001); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, 
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(2004). 
145 See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
146 Hopkins, supra note 134. 
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EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION ix (Jack Balkin et al. 
eds., 2002). 
148 Id. at 185. 
149 BELL, supra note 96, at 69–70. 
150 Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Final Civil Rights Act, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 597 (1991). 
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allowing “all employers, proprietors of public facilities, and owners and 
managers of dwelling places” actual license to discriminate against blacks 
by paying a fee and a quarterly tax.151 The RPLA’s proceeds would be 
placed in an “‘equality fund’ used to underwrite black businesses, offer 
no-interest mortgage loans for black home buyers, and provide 
scholarships for black students seeking college and vocational 
education.”152 Bell worked out a burden-shifting proof scheme for 
discrimination claims against RPLA license holders and even authored a 
racially realistic presidential signing statement.153 
 Freedom of Employment Act.154 This federal law would “ban[] all 
affirmative action programs” and “assume[] that all persons who, because 
of their race or ethnicity, were actual or potential beneficiaries of 
affirmative action policies obtained the positions they now hold 
unfairly.”155 
 Ultimate Voting Rights Act.156 The No Taxation Without Representation 
Voter Bill157 would create a special Voter Travel Fund from half of 
campaign contributions to cover voting-related travel expenses and 
mandate that racial minorities would be able “to elect representatives of 
their choice in numbers equal to their portion of the population eligible to 
vote.”158 
 Rules of Race Relations Law.159 Another restatement of the Interest-
Convergence Thesis160 and Racial Realism Rule161 into two Rules. The 
first Rule of Race Relations Law is as follows: 
Racial remedies are the outward manifestations of unspoken 
and perhaps unconscious conclusions that such remedies—if 
adopted—will secure, advance, or at least not harm the 
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interests of whites in power.162 
The second Rule is stated thus: 
The benefits to blacks of civil rights policies are often 
symbolic rather than substantive, and when the crisis that 
prompted their enactment ends, they will infrequently be 
enforced for blacks, though in altered interpretations they may 
serve the needs of whites.163 
 Black Reparations Foundation.164 The richest white man in the world 
would establish the Black Reparations Foundation, “whose simple 
purpose is to bring economic justice today to the least fortunate of those 
black people whose forebears were refused such justice after the Civil 
War.”165 With anonymous contributions from other wealthy individuals, 
the privately-funded Foundation would disperse over $25 billion (over $5 
trillion in 2017 dollars) in grants to all American blacks “based on free-
enterprise models in which monthly payments are a percentage of 
currently earned income . . . carefully calibrated to reward enterprise and 
discourage sloth.”166 
 Racial Toleration Laws.167 These state laws would “severely restrict[]—
and, in some states, ban[] outright—public teaching that promoted racial 
hatred by focusing on the past strife between blacks and whites. Penalties 
[would be] severe for leading or participating in unauthorized public 
healing sessions, or for publicly wearing what the law termed ‘symbols 
of racial hatred.’”168 
 Quality of Education Model Desegregation Plan. Perhaps Bell’s most 
explicitly practical work was published in 1980 when Bell was Dean of 
the University of Oregon Law School in an anthology he edited, Shades 
of Brown: New Perspectives on School Desegregation.169 He explicitly 
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stated that his audience was black parents whose children attended all-
black schools and judges supervising school districts under court 
desegregation orders with all-black schools.170 Echoing his later dissent 
in a rewriting of the Brown opinion,171 Bell’s model plan explicitly stated 
that its purpose should be “to bring minority schools up to the academic 
standards of mainly white schools in the district.”172 He also included 
summaries and citations of federal case law to prepare legal arguments in 
support of such plans.173 
 Race, Racism, and American Law Casebook.174 Bell first authored this 
unconventional constitutional law casebook in 1973.175 The casebook 
used published legal doctrine, commentary, and hypothetical legal 
doctrine to explore Bell’s long-time belief in the permanency of U.S. 
racism.176 As Bell explained: 
[His casebook’s] approach was unorthodox, particularly in its 
departure from the view that law school texts should be 
objective and not take sides. Rather, the book’s point of 
departure is that racism is both wrong and the greatest barrier 
to realization of the nation’s often pledged but seldom realized 
ideals. The challenge of the book and for those who adopt it 
to teach courses on racial discrimination is to explore the 
history of racism, examine its current methods of functioning, 
and perhaps grasp the factors contributing to its resilience to 
reform.177 
It is not surprising that Bell wrote all of this hypothetical legal doctrine 
outside of the traditional legal system. Even after he left his civil rights 
practice to become a law professor, Bell remained a perpetual outsider–
protester in the Academy. 
C.         Perpetual Outsider Protester 
When Bell chose to resign from the DOJ rather than renounce his $2 
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NAACP membership, he set the tone for the rest of his legal career. As a legal 
academic, he tried unsuccessfully to be an insider incrementalist and 
subsequently embraced his outsider protester role. Like Gandhi178 and Martin 
Luther King, Jr.179 before him, Bell understood that when seeking to change 
society, the rule of law was a clumsy and unreliable tool. 
Like Gandhi and King, Bell understood that public protest could be a 
much more effective tool to change perceived unjust policies for two reasons. 
First, public protest put the contested policy under public scrutiny and forced 
the Master to justify the policy publically.180 Moreover, if the protester 
happened to be a visible member of the community, as Bell’s hero Hastie was 
during World War II as the highest black War Department official181 and as 
Bell was as the first black tenured professor at Harvard Law School and the 
first black dean of the University of Oregon Law School,182 then the Master 
might be forced to make changes to save face. Hastie’s protest undoubtedly 
contributed to President Truman’s Executive Order 9981 abolishing 
segregation in the armed forces.183 Likewise, Bell’s protest undoubtedly 
contributed to the much higher number of minority and women faculty at 
Harvard Law and Oregon Law today.184 
Second, unlike a classical liberal or armchair academic, the protester 
shares the same suffering that the people for whom she is protesting 
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experience.185 The protester’s injury is not hypothetical or abstract. The 
protester’s injury is real life. By resigning in protest, both Hastie and Bell 
gave up excellent jobs for the unknown. They risked their families’ welfare. 
When Bell took an unpaid leave of absence from Harvard Law School until 
it hired its first woman-of-color tenure-track professor, his wife, Jewel, was 
battling cancer.186 She died three months later.187 
Even before his disillusionment, Bell felt uncomfortable when he was 
lauded as a brave, crusading civil rights lawyer because his sacrifice paled in 
comparison to “what [his] black clients had to deal with every day.”188 
Thurgood Marshall, who earlier had told Bell to save his protesting for the 
courtroom and not the real world,189 also understood that as a traditional 
lawyer he did not share his client’s suffering. When his biographer Carl 
Rowan praised Marshall for his courage, Marshall retorted: “You forget just 
one little fucking thing. I go into these places and I come out, on the fastest 
vehicle moving. The brave blacks are the ones who have to live there after I 
leave.”190 
As Bell’s second wife Janet reflected, Bell “understood the parallels 
between his work as a civil rights attorney and his support for student 
demands for diversity. He did not protest for the sake of protesting. Nor did 
he shy away from taking principled, sometimes public and controversial, 
stands.”191 With the benefit of hindsight, Bell later reflected: “Had I 
understood before accepting Harvard’s offer how ingrained the hiring and 
tenure practices are, I likely would not have taken the job.”192 
When first hired in 1968, Bell understood that Harvard would be 
hiring additional tenure-track black faculty after him.193 After six years of 
watching highly qualified black candidates never receive an offer for a 
tenure-track position at Harvard, Bell wrote an open letter in 1974 to Harvard 
Law School Dean Albert Sacks, copying all the Harvard faculty, where Bell 
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declared that he would resign at the end of the year unless Harvard hired 
another black faculty member.194 A few months later, Harvard hired its 
second black male faculty member.195 Dean Sacks made sure to inform Bell 
that his letter had nothing to do with the hiring.196 A few years later, Harvard 
hired its third black male faculty member.197 
With Wechsler, Dean Albert Sacks is considered one of LPS’s 
founding fathers.198 Bell ironically offered Sacks as an example of how the 
credentials required by the academic Master “strongly correlate to upper-
class standing.”199 Sacks, along with Henry Hart, Jr.—Wechsler’s Federal 
Courts co-author and another LPS founding father—never published their 
Legal Process casebook.200 Although the Legal Process School takes its name 
from Hart and Sacks’ book, the book was only published posthumously. Bell 
believed that Sacks, perhaps like Wechsler, benefited from white privilege: 
I don’t think [any of the Harvard Law faculty] cared that 
[Sacks] never published a book. There was a consensus: Al 
Sacks could do it if he wanted to. That was enough. The same 
acceptance was extended to several other [white] faculty 
members whose scholarly promise far exceeded their 
performance.201 
Needless to say, Bell did not believe that non-white faculty like himself 
would be given the same benefit of the doubt by his white colleagues.202 
Five years later, in 1979, Bell decided to try his hand at the Master’s 
game. He applied to be Dean of the University of Oregon Law School.203 In 
1980, he was offered the job.204 Recognizing potential obstacles, Bell urged 
the faculty to consider the significance of “hiring a black man committed to 
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civil rights to head a mainly white law school in a state with no more than 
one or two percent black citizens. ‘We are ready,’ they assured me.”205 Bell 
accepted the job and served as Oregon Law’s dean from 1980 to 1986.206 He 
resigned in 1986 to protest the faculty’s unwillingness to hire an Asian-
American woman.207 She had been ranked third behind two white males.208 
When the two white males rejected Oregon’s offers, a few professors 
convinced a majority of the faculty that “we could do better.”209 As a result, 
the faculty refused to give an offer to the Asian-American woman, electing 
instead to reopen the search.210 Bell admitted that he resigned out of 
“frustration, rather than any good judgment or political sense.”211 
Bell then visited at Stanford Law School to teach Constitutional Law, 
a required first-year course.212 As he had done at several other law schools, 
Bell used an unconventional pedagogical method, critiquing American 
constitutional law through a racial and socioeconomic lens.213 He later 
learned from the local Black Law Students Association (BLSA) that about 24 
of his students had started attending other Constitutional Law sections with 
the instructors’ approval.214 Instead of telling the students to give Bell a 
chance, these two faculty members had secretly accepted the students’ 
criticisms of Bell’s teaching ability without giving Bell an opportunity to 
respond.215 To make matters worse, a faculty member had invited Bell to 
speak at a public lecture series secretly designed to compensate for Bell’s 
perceived teaching incompetence.216 
The BLSA students told Bell that they were going to protest the 
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lecture series as racist.217 He encouraged their protest.218 The student protest 
led to the cancellation of the series and the return of the students who had 
previously left Bell’s Constitutional Law section.219 Bell later wrote: “Even 
some weeks after the event, I am unable to rationally express the range of my 
feelings from abject humiliation to absolute outrage. . . . It was by a 
considerable margin, the worst moment of my professional life.”220 
After the BLSA protest publically shamed the Stanford faculty, 
everyone involved apologized to Bell.221 Bell’s friend and, ironically, noted 
LPS scholar Dean John Hart Ely222 apologized to Bell and urged him to forget 
the incident.223 After some deliberation, Bell decided to forego leaving 
quietly and instead protested the incident.224 He authored a description of the 
incident in the Stanford Law School Journal entitled The Price and Pain of 
Racial Perspective.225 He also mailed letters to other law school deans across 
the country explaining what had happened to him and urging them to discuss 
the incident at faculty meetings.226 Although initially defensive, Stanford 
Law School eventually responded positively to Bell’s protest, holding a series 
of town hall meetings to discuss the law school’s receptiveness to innovative 
pedagogy, racial minorities, and diverse viewpoints.227 
Bell then returned to Harvard Law School in 1987, where there were 
now three other black male faculty but still no women of color on the 
faculty.228 Harvard women-of-color law students then asked for Bell’s help 
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to lobby Harvard Law to hire its first woman-of-color professor.229 Bell 
became convinced that only a female law professor of color could provide 
the needed unique intersecting perspective the students sought.230 A man of 
color or a white woman simply couldn’t provide the same perspective.231 
Although a “few of his liberal colleagues” at Harvard “had told him, in 
private, that they were with him . . . when it came time to vote, most 
invariably melted away, switching sides or abstaining.”232 When the Harvard 
faculty failed to extend an offer to a visiting professor, a talented black 
woman who had taught during the 1989–1990 school year in a “look-see” 
visit, Bell decided that he had to protest again.233 His biographers’ description 
of Bell’s decision-making process highlights Bell’s preference for outsider 
protest over insider incremental reform: 
“Is it possible,” he muttered to himself, “that some of my 
friends are right, and with almost fifteen years of service here, 
I can do more working from within?” He smiled, recalling that 
he had rejected similar advice more than thirty years earlier 
when he had chosen to leave the Justice Department over its 
ultimatum that he resign from the NAACP and that he had 
asserted for years that civil rights lawyers and activists need 
to stand ready to supplement petitions, lawsuits, and other 
forms of polite supplication with street protests and other 
forms of militancy. He turned to his computer and began 
writing his speech to what he expected would be a large and 
supportive gathering of students.234 
In that 1990 speech, Bell announced that he would take an unpaid leave of 
absence until Harvard hired its first woman-of-color law professor.235 
His wife Jewel, seriously ill with breast cancer, did not oppose his 
protest but “wondered why he was always the one who took risks to protest 
what he considered racial injustices.”236 When Jewel died three months later, 
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Bell “remained determined to see his battle through.”237 Because Harvard 
limited faculty leaves of absence to two consecutive years, Bell ended up 
giving up tenure at Harvard.238 In 1992, Harvard dismissed Bell from his 
position as Weld Professor of Law.239 Harvard eventually hired a woman-of-
color law professor in 1998.240 
In the end, Bell perhaps found the perfect job where he could remain 
the perpetual outsider. His former law student, John Sexton, was now Dean 
of the New York University School of Law (NYU Law).241 Although Sexton 
offered to have the NYU Law faculty vote to grant him tenure, Bell 
declined.242 Instead, Bell signed a one-year contract as a visiting professor of 
law.243 He would sign 18 more. For 19 years, from 1992 until his death in 
2011, Bell remained a permanent visiting professor at NYU Law.244 As a 
permanent visitor, Bell did not attend faculty meetings or participate in 
faculty governance.245 This arrangement, admitted Bell, helped keep him out 
of trouble.246 While Bell ended his life as a perpetual outsider, Wechsler lived 
his entire life as the consummate insider. 
III. HERBERT WECHSLER’S TRANSFORMATIVE RECONSTRUCTION OF LEGAL 
DOCTRINE 
Herbert Wechsler was one of the American legal profession’s elder 
statesmen at the time upstart Crits like Bell started questioning the utility of 
the rule of law and legal doctrine for marginalized people. Famed journalist 
Anthony Lewis wrote of Wechsler: “There was a gravity about him, a sense 
of sureness about the law.”247 Judge Richard Posner, himself one of 
Wechsler’s critics, gave Wechsler quite a complement, writing that “there is 
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no longer anyone in the legal profession who has the kind of stature that a 
Wechsler achieved.”248 Orin Kerr claimed that a biography about Wechsler 
would be an interesting and important scholarly contribution.249 Wechsler’s 
famous Neutral Principles article250 remains the fifth most-cited law review 
article of all time.251 Bell himself called Wechsler “an outstanding lawyer, a 
frequent advocate for civil rights causes, and a scholar of prestige and 
influence.”252 
Wechsler may have been, as Posner claimed, one of the last traditional 
guild masters who instructed lawyers and judges in the craft of legal 
reasoning. Wechsler was “in the university but of the legal profession . . . 
training the next generation of lawyers and through scholarship—through law 
review articles, treatises, model laws, and restatements of the law—guiding 
judges and practicing lawyers in the path of sound legal reasoning.”253 
Throughout his legal career, Wechsler remained the consummate 
incrementalist insider legal reformer.254 In particular, his co-authorship of the 
most famous federal courts treatise, his service as Executive Director of the 
ALI, which continues to create black-letter Restatements of the Law, and his 
principal drafting of the Model Penal Code all demonstrate that he also was 
a master of crafting, assessing, and revising legal doctrine. 
A.         Incrementalist Insider Reformer 
Wechsler graduated from Columbia Law School in 1931 at the age of 
22.255 He had received his B.A. from the City College of New York at 19.256 
He was Editor-in-Chief of the Columbia Law Review.257 Noted legal realist 
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Karl Llewellyn taught Wechsler at Columbia.258 After graduating law school, 
Wechsler clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone from 
1932 to 1933.259 
  During that clerkship, in the Columbia Law School faculty’s own 
words, “questions of the scope of the Supreme Court’s power of 
constitutional review were posed with a heated intensity never yet exceeded 
in our history.”260 Among his many rule-of-law accomplishments, Justice 
Stone later authored the famous Carolene Products Footnote Four, where in 
dictum he articulated an elegant, specific application of Critical Legal 
Process’s more general rule-of-law concern: “whether prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly 
more searching judicial inquiry.”261 Amidst the racial strife of 1965, 
Wechsler commented on Footnote Four: “Narrower scope, more exacting 
judicial scrutiny indeed! What a change in the legal cosmos those few words 
portended in the quarter century ahead!”262 
Stone would also later author Hirabayashi v. United States, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision upholding the curfew of Japanese nationals.263 As a 
government lawyer, Wechsler later would rely extensively upon Hirabayashi 
when defending the Japanese internment in Korematsu.264 
After completing his clerkship, Wechsler joined the Columbia Law 
School faculty.265 He stayed at Columbia—taking extended leaves of absence 
for public service—until his final retirement in 1992.266 
Instead of rehashing his entire biography, this section will highlight 
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Wechsler’s long interaction with subordinated minority groups. This 
interaction consistently demonstrated his belief in incremental, insider legal 
reform. During a time when support for civil rights causes was not 
widespread, Wechsler showed great courage by authoring a Yale Law 
Review article in 1934 advocating for federal anti-lynching legislation and 
federal intervention in the South to assist blacks.267 He was unafraid of the 
ire of white supremacists and anti-Communists alike when he represented 
black Communist Angelo Herndon in Herndon v. Georgia, a case that 
ultimately ended up in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.268 
With the outbreak of World War II, Wechsler took a leave of absence 
from Columbia to serve in the DOJ.269 His leave of absence for the federal 
government totaled six years.270 In 1941, as an Assistant Attorney General, 
he authored the United States’ Supreme Court brief in United States v. 
Classic, a criminal prosecution of white election commissioners who 
tampered with Democratic primary votes to favor white congressional 
candidates.271 
In light of the Classic opinion, the NAACP petitioned for the Court 
to hear Smith v. Allwright.272 Thurgood Marshall thought that DOJ’s amicus 
curiae support of the NAACP’s petition might persuade the Court to grant 
their petition, so Marshall personally visited then-Attorney General Francis 
Biddle and Biddle’s Assistant Attorney General Herbert Wechsler.273 
Wechsler advised Biddle not to assist the NAACP because, among other 
reasons, to do so would make the DOJ appear less neutral. As Wechsler 
explained: 
Well, I thought it over, . . . and my advice to Biddle was not 
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to go in with Marshall. . . . I felt that if we came in with 
Marshall and asked the Court to extend Classic, our role could 
actually be hurtful. . . . We were a governmental department, 
. . . and we had to get along with the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, which was dominated by the Southerners—and 
this seemed an unnecessary fight.274 
Wechsler added that Marshall understood the DOJ’s political view and did 
not protest their decision: 
When I told Thurgood that the answer would be no, he took it 
very well. He said, “I’m sorry, we’d like to have you with us, 
but we’ll just have to go it alone. I see your position.” That 
was one of his great virtues—seeing things from the other 
fellow’s side. He was a good, tough advocate who functioned 
without having to feel that his opponents were either knaves 
or fools.275 
Despite the DOJ’s unwillingness to support the LDF, the Supreme Court 
nevertheless ended up granting certiorari in Allwright.276 Wechsler would 
later name Allwright as another Supreme Court opinion, like Brown, where 
he “with all sincerity” could not find “neutral principles that satisfy the mind” 
to justify the results of which he otherwise approved.277 
Wechsler and Marshall would spar again, on November 10, 1951, 
when Wechsler helped moot the LDF’s Brown team on their Supreme Court 
appellate strategy.278 Despite his withering criticism of Brown, Wechsler 
made clear that he thought Brown‘s desegregation outcome had “the best 
chance of making an enduring contribution to the quality of our society.”279 
His belief in the justness of Brown‘s outcome was the reason Wechsler 
decided to use Brown as “the hardest test of [his] belief in principled 
adjudication.”280 
The Columbia Law School faculty were actively involved in the 
Brown litigation. In particular, both Charles Black, who joined the Columbia 
Law faculty in 1947, and Jack Weinstein, who joined the Columbia Law 
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faculty in 1952, were key members of the Brown team.281 Perhaps Black 
coordinated the LDF moot court. Black later authored what may be the most 
effective and most biting critique of “Neutral Principles”.282 Black’s valid 
points notwithstanding, for the rest of his legal career, Wechsler remained 
unpersuaded by all criticism, believing that he had effectively rebutted all 
attacks.283 Weinstein would later be Of Counsel at the LDF,284 a federal 
judge,285 and a renowned evidence scholar.286 One can only imagine what 
debate their presence on the same law school faculty might have generated. 
During that vigorous moot court, Wechsler’s criticism of the 
NAACP’s legal strategy foreshadowed his later criticism of the Supreme 
Court’s Brown opinion.287 He posited that “Plessy [v. Ferguson] had a certain 
nagging ‘intellectual strength.’”288 Segregating blacks and whites, argued 
Wechsler, is not a denial of equal protection because both races face similar 
limitations on their liberty.289 Blacks cannot associate with whites but neither 
can whites associate with blacks. How is that a denial of equal protection?  
NAACP lawyer and future federal judge Robert Carter290 responded 
“that segregated black and white children were not wronged equally.”291 
Marshall continued that the Court would need to take judicial notice that 
white communities had greater political and lawmaking powers than black 
                                                 
281 See Robert D. McFadden, Charles L. Black Jr., 85, Constitutional Law Expert Who Wrote 
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communities, and that whites in fact imposed segregation on blacks.292 
Apparently now willing to look beyond lofty principles to factual 
reality, Wechsler asked—in an argument that echoed Bell’s later criticism of 
Brown’s focus on integrating the races to the detriment of equal educational 
opportunity293—whether a black child attending a segregated school was 
worse off than a black child attending an integrated school where she might 
feel the full brunt of white prejudice.294 What about the limited economic and 
social opportunity of the wider de facto segregated world that awaited a black 
student enrolled in an integrated school? 
Psychologist Kenneth Clark responded: “Which is better—to be sick 
or to be dead? Segregated school is a sort of fatality.”295 But, persisted 
Wechsler, was a black child any more harmed in a segregated school than in 
an overtly hostile white school?296 Clark then conceded Wechsler’s point.297 
In its briefs and oral argument, the NAACP did not address Wechsler’s lofty 
arguments.298 As a result, neither did the Supreme Court in its subsequent 
Brown opinion.299 
At the time of the moot, Wechsler had just stepped down as Assistant 
Attorney General in charge of the DOJ’s War Division, where he supervised 
the Japanese internment and martial law in Hawaii and argued Korematsu for 
the United States in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.300 He later quipped that 
“[t]hese were nice cases for testing the role of the government lawyer.”301 As 
part of his duties, Wechsler also interacted with then-internment proponent 
(and later U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice) California Attorney General 
Earl Warren.302 
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Although the DOJ misled the Court in Korematsu,303 Wechsler 
adamantly maintained that he never personally made any material 
misrepresentations.304 But as the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the 
War Department’s legal strategy, surely the buck and the blame should stop 
with him. Given Wechsler’s civil rights bona fides, it was not surprising that 
Wechsler admitted that he had been “deeply disturbed” by the imprisonment 
of innocent Japanese-Americans into internment camps but at the time had 
“put aside his personal feelings and performed his duty as a lawyer.”305 In 
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his Neutral Principles article, Wechsler said that he thought the Japanese 
internment was “an abomination when it happened, though in the line of duty 
as a lawyer [he] participated in the effort to sustain it in the Court.”306 
Speaking in front of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, Wechsler, 
a Jew, would later characterize the internment’s “relocation centers” as “what 
in any fair estimate could be called concentration camps.”307 “No one,” he 
later said, “could have felt more distressed about [the internment’s] existence, 
other than those personally affected by it, than I.”308 
Perhaps indicating that he remained at peace with his “I was just 
following orders” excuse, during a 1980 interview, Wechsler himself 
volunteered the obvious questions: If he disagreed with the internment, why 
did not he resign, and why did he cooperate with such manifest injustice?309 
In Wechsler’s own words: 
Now, the interesting question about all this that you should 
ask yourself is really the resigning question. When is the right 
thing to do to get out? Or to put it another way, when should 
you feel compromised by participating at all in a proceeding 
that may result in sustaining something that you would feel 
regret about having sustained? 
. . .  
Should I have declined[?] . . . I might have done that. In fact, 
however, I did not. I did superintend the preparation of that 
brief. It presented the strongest arguments that I felt could be 
made in support of the validity of the action taken by the 
President.310 
Wechsler’s answer to his own question echoed the core fiction of the 
rule of law, the idea that compartmentalizing lawmaking by role, without 
taking the overall motives or circumstances into account, would create a sense 
of neutrality or objectivity.311 He managed to apply this legal fiction even to 
his own personal decision-making: 
You may ask why I did it. Of course, I could have resigned. . 
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. . . I did it because it seemed to me that the separation of 
function in society justified and, indeed, required the course 
that I pursued; . . . one of the ways in which a rich society 
avoids what might otherwise prove to be insoluble dilemmas 
of choice is to recognize a separation of functions, a 
distribution of responsibilities, with respect to problems of 
that kind, and this is particularly recurrent in the legal 
profession.312 
The questions and answers to end this portion of the interview are 
particularly instructive. Wechsler did not try to water down his own extreme 
commitment, waffle on the decisiveness of his “insoluble dilemma[] of 
choice,” or apologize for his actions.313 He understood that his choice was 
dichotomous—either resign or be a loyal soldier: 
Are you saying that the issue was either to resign or to carry 
out the task? 
Yes. 
And there was no other middle ground? 
What middle ground could there have been? 
Was it ever a serious option for you? I mean, did you consider 
the resignation option seriously? 
No, I never considered it seriously. That was not my view.314 
Compare Wechsler’s loyal devotion to duty over personal principle 
with the way Bell and his hero William Hastie reacted to conflicts of 
conscience.315 Despite his personal aversion to protest, Wechsler nevertheless 
recognized that if “our system gives to dissidence no other institutional 
avenue of expression,” then the only remaining active choice was “civil 
disobedience subject to the charge of lawlessness and thus to ultimate 
repression.”316 Wechsler also considered reason to be at the heart of protest, 
observing that “a protest, [has] only such weight as [its] reasoning affords.”317 
As he demonstrated first at the DOJ and time and time again as an academic, 
Bell undoubtedly would have resigned from his position, if not engaged in an 
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active protest.318 
In addition to being the first black federal judge, Hastie was also the 
Dean of Howard University School of Law, Special Adviser to the Secretary 
of War, and Governor of the Virgin Islands.319 During World War II, Hastie 
was the highest black civilian official in the War Department.320 As Louis 
Pollak observed (the same Pollak who had opposed Wechsler’s criticism of 
Brown),321 when faced with Wechsler’s dichotomy in 1943, Hastie chose to 
resign on personal principle rather than collaborate with those who refused to 
change an immoral discriminatory policy: 
I would say a word about Hastie’s instinctive devotion to 
principle. One of the earliest and most celebrated evidences of 
Hastie’s stubborn integrity was his resignation, in the middle 
of the war, from the highest civilian post to which a black had 
been appointed—Special Adviser to Secretary Stimson. 
Hastie’s quarrel was with the Air Force, which resolutely 
continued to follow the flight patterns of Jim Crow. And the 
best way Hastie knew to call attention to this festering wrong 
was to remove himself from collaboration with those who had 
authority to take corrective action.322 
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The black press lauded Hastie’s resignation.323 In particular, W.E.B. 
DuBois not only commended Hastie’s protest but also implicitly criticized 
Wechsler’s insider choice: 
There are two sorts of public relations officials in Washington 
working on the situation of the Negro: one sort is a kind of 
upper clerk who transmits to the public with such apologetic 
airs as he can assume, the refusal of the department to follow 
his advice or the advice of anyone else calculated to cease the 
racial situation. The other kind of race relations official seeks 
to give advice and to get the facts and if he receives a 
reasonable amount of cooperation he works on hopeful. If he 
does not, he withdraws. It is, of course, this second type of 
official alone who is useful and valuable. The other is nothing. 
Hastie belongs to the valuable sort and will not be easily 
replaced.324 
Five years after Hastie’s resignation, in 1948, segregation was abolished in 
the U.S. military.325 At the end of the war, Wechsler served as Chief 
Technical Adviser to the U.S. judges at the Nuremberg War Crimes 
Tribunal.326 
World War II ended.327 The Korean War came and went.328 The Cold 
War began.329 Bell would later argue that the real reason for Brown was to 
mask U.S. hypocrisy during the Cold War.330 It was hypocritical for the 
United States to claim to champion freedom against communism overseas 
while at the same time to maintain segregation at home.331 By providing 
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Brown as a paper tiger with no enforcement, the United States could now 
claim to have remedied its former hypocrisy while in actuality maintaining 
blacks’ subordination.332 
In 1959, five years after Brown I333 and a year after Cooper v. Aaron 
(the only U.S. Supreme Court opinion signed by all nine Justices where the 
Court reiterated the federal government’s supremacy over Arkansas’ 
executive and legislative resistance to Brown, and the Court’s power of 
judicial review),334 Wechsler delivered the Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law 
School, which became his Neutral Principles article published that same 
year.335 
Wechsler’s Neutral Principles article has been extensively analyzed 
and critiqued elsewhere.336 This analysis only highlights the article’s 
relevance to the rule of law. In the article, Wechsler wrote that the “main 
qualities of law” were “its generality and its neutrality.”337 “A principled 
decision . . . rests on reasons with respect to all the issues . . . reasons that in 
their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is 
involved.”338 Perhaps he best explained his “neutral principles” concept 20 
years later: “I found myself developing the neutral principles ideas as a 
pedagogical instrument for pushing students into subjecting their own 
immediate reactions of approval or disapproval of the results of a particular 
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decision to a more searching type of criterion of evaluation.”339 
As Posner observed, Wechsler thus elevated a law school pedagogical 
technique to a “methodological requirement of constitutional 
adjudication.”340 A principle is neutral “only if it treats consistently not only 
the case at hand but any hypothetical or actual case within the principle’s 
semantic scope.”341 Such principles thus are an “appeal to reason—reason 
stated in a principle fairly susceptible of general and neutral application.”342 
The “real test” of such principles is “in the force of the analysis.”343 Wechsler 
later clarified that his idea was not meant to provide a decision-making 
formula but rather a test to confirm the decision-maker’s objectivity: 
It is not, of course, thought of as a formula to guide or produce 
the decision of hard cases, but rather as a negative test, a test 
to be applied by a judge, with the essence of the question 
whether he is being adequately consistent in the process of 
adjudication, in reaching a particular type of result in a 
particular type of case. That is to say, essentially that he ask 
himself, “Would I reach the same result if the substantive 
interests were otherwise?”344 
In other words, neutral principles do not “dispense[] with the agony of 
judgment in arriving at decisions.”345 
Neutral principles, as Wechsler conceived them, were a fairly narrow 
concept aimed at judges reviewing legislation.346 Wechsler conceded that his 
article has been misunderstood to “seem[] [to] claim[] more for the neutral 
principles concept than I ever undertook to claim for it.”347 Wechsler 
continued: “I never quite had the missionary sense about that article that so 
many people have kind of assumed I had. I didn’t have a sense that the ideas 
that I was expressing had the novelty that some people think I thought they 
had.”348 Wechsler added, “there was nothing novel in my insistence that the 
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legitimacy of the decision is to be gauged in terms of the reasons given for 
it.”349 He admitted that his “neutral principles” concept left “room for a much 
broader exegesis” but explained that he simply had not had time to write 
one.350 Wechsler never further elaborated on his “neutral principles” idea. 
Nevertheless, his “neutral principles” meme has taken on a life of its own. As 
Kent Greenawalt recognized, the concept of neutral principles in lawmaking 
continues to have “enduring significance.”351 
 Greenawalt also recognized that Wechsler did not “mean to equate 
principled decision with correct decision. . . . An opinion can be principled 
but unsound in its interpretation of the Constitution.”352 Wechsler recognized 
that much legal doctrine, particularly legal doctrine impacting previously 
subordinated groups, involved value choices. As he wrote in Neutral 
Principles, “some ordering of social values is essential . . . all cannot be given 
equal weight.”353 Even if a judge must choose among constitutionally 
protected values, she still should “give it an even-handed development” and 
rely upon neutral principles when choosing.354 Wechsler believed that cynical 
outcome-determinative lawmaking, where “you either like the results of 
decisions or you don’t, appraising them in terms of your own values,” 
doomed law to be no different than politics.355 
One of the reasons Wechsler chose to criticize Brown was because he 
wanted “to exhibit the tension between results and bases, in terms of 
situations where [he] liked the result, but felt a moral obligation to question 
the grounds.”356 His former student and colleague Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg explained that Wechsler’s point was “that the way we decide things 
is . . . as important as what we decide.”357 
Perhaps Wechsler’s most glaring error remains his disregard of his 
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own white privilege358—a legitimate criticism of not only Wechsler but also 
many normative reconstructionists,359 the rule of law concept, and legal 
doctrine writ large.360 Similar to how white men often are blissfully unaware 
that whiteness remains the silent default in American society,361 the Master 
can remain ignorant of the fact that, by positivist and formalist default, the 
rule of law reinforces preexisting legal doctrine.362 
In his explanation of how he thought a personal anecdote illustrated 
his freedom-of-association neutral principle for Brown, Wechsler 
inadvertently revealed startling ignorance of his own white privilege. He had 
befriended Howard University School of Law Dean Charles Hamilton 
Houston. Houston was Hastie’s second cousin and had first brought Hastie to 
Howard.363 Houston’s “lawyer as social engineer” statement represents the 
pinnacle of the rule-of-law normative reconstructionist vision.364 Houston’s 
famous words remain Howard Law’s school motto: 
A lawyer’s either a social engineer or ... a parasite on society 
... A social engineer [is] a highly skilled, perceptive, sensitive 
lawyer who [understands] the Constitution of the United 
States and [knows] how to explore its uses in the solving of 
problems of local communities and in bettering conditions of 
the underprivileged citizens.365 
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Wechsler recalled Houston as “a charming, delightful man” who “seemed 
moderate in his manner but his determination was evident.”366 In his Neutral 
Principles article, Wechsler decided to use a spontaneous lunch with Houston 
to illustrate his point: “In the days when I was joined with Charles H. Houston 
in a litigation in the Supreme Court [in 1935] . . . he did not suffer more than 
I in knowing that we had to go to Union Station to lunch together during the 
recess.”367 
 Twenty years later, Wechsler explained that as he was hurrying out 
from the U.S. Supreme Court building (then housed in the old Senate Office 
Building), he bumped into Houston, who was there to file a petition for 
rehearing.368 Wechsler explained: “I proposed that we have lunch in the 
Capitol . . . and he said no, we couldn’t do that, but we might go over to Union 
Station for a bite. I hadn’t realized.”369 
Bell recognized that Wechsler remained painfully oblivious to the 
obvious, that the Jim Crow system did not treat whites and blacks equally but 
rather was designed to subjugate blacks in favor of whites. “To doubt,” Bell 
wrote, “that racial segregation is harmful to blacks, and to suggest what 
blacks really sought was the right to associate with whites, is to believe in a 
world that does not exist now and could not possibly have existed then.”370 
Only in a fantasy world of hypothetical assumptions and mind games 
did Wechsler’s argument make sense. As Geoffrey Hazard observed, if blacks 
have a right to associate with whites, then under neutral principles, whites 
should have a right to associate with whites too.371 But then how could both 
blacks and whites equally share a right of free association? The right to 
associate freely with whom you choose also includes the right to exclude 
those with whom you don’t wish to associate.372 
While Wechsler’s argument was logical and might have made for a 
good law school exam question, as Bell correctly recognized, the argument 
had no basis in reality. The whole point of Jim Crow and slavery’s vestiges 
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was to keep blacks subordinate and inferior to whites. Wechsler inexplicably 
rejected this argument,373 going so far as to agree with Plessy that if blacks 
felt inferior, “it is solely because [blacks] choose ‘to put that construction 
upon it.’”374 
Whites wanted to associate with whites because legal doctrine treated 
whites as the Masters. Associating with whites meant receiving superior 
goods and services. Associating with blacks meant receiving inferior goods 
and services. Most blacks probably could have cared less about associating 
with whites for whites’ sake. Blacks wanted to be treated the same as whites, 
which meant having equal access to the same restaurants only open to whites. 
The association with whites was only incidental to the better treatment. 
Houston, as a black man, understood that he could not eat lunch at the 
most convenient restaurant because blacks were legally forbidden from 
eating there. Wechsler, however, had not realized that the best and most 
convenient restaurants were limited only to whites. Blacks were relegated to 
the train station. Like the rule of law, Wechsler may have had good intentions 
in trying to break bread in public with a black man, but ended up spotlighting 
his own foolishness. Under Wechsler’s own neutral principles logic, his good 
intentions are not entitled to any weight or deference.375 Bell might have 
observed that, like Wechsler, the rule of law has good intentions but remains 
caught up in its own legal fictions and is thus ignorant about the real world. 
As Bell recognized, the “equal” in “separate but equal” was a glaring 
lie.376 Surely Wechsler was surrounded by ample evidence of this lie in 
Washington, D.C., and New York City. How could Wechsler not notice it? 
Wechsler was blind not only to segregation’s ugly realities but also to the 
clear ludicrousness of his example. Someone with perhaps more self-
awareness than Wechsler would have been ashamed to mention the anecdote 
to anyone else. Anyone more reflective of their own privilege probably would 
                                                 
373 Wechsler appeared to grasp this argument in Neutral Principles yet nevertheless rejected 
it. He understood that Brown “must have rested on the view that racial segregation is, in 
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not have drawn more attention to this embarrassing anecdote by mentioning 
it at a high profile Holmes Lecture at Harvard and in a published attack on 
the beloved Brown opinion.377 
Ironically, Wechsler appeared to believe that the anecdote was self-
evident not for the obvious proposition—that segregation mistreated blacks 
more than whites—but for the ludicrous suggestion that Wechsler and 
Houston were both equally inconvenienced at lunch. But Wechsler clearly 
was not equally inconvenienced. As a white man, he could have eaten 
anywhere. Notice also that Wechsler was not likewise excluded from the 
Union Station restaurant. Even though a white man, he apparently could eat 
at a blacks-only restaurant if he so desired.378 
Houston however did not share Wechsler’s luxury. As a black man, 
Houston was far more inconvenienced because the closest restaurant where 
he could eat was much further for him than for Wechsler. Similar to how he 
assumed equal inconvenience when none such existed, Wechsler assumed the 
equality of segregated school facilities when he volunteered freedom of 
association as a possible neutral principle to justify Brown’s result.379 But, as 
Judge Carter had replied during their earlier moot court and Bell later 
observed, there were no equal, segregated school facilities.380 Black school 
facilities were always inferior to white ones. Wechsler was abstractly 
assuming a ludicrous fantasy world. 
A much better example of neutral principles in action was Wechsler’s 
counsel to the U.S. judges at the Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal. Wechsler 
convinced the U.S. judges to use neutral principles to adjudicate accused 
enemy war criminals. He encouraged U.S. judges to “judge the enemy only 
by standards that we would apply to ourselves, be willing to apply to 
ourselves, and feel obliged to apply to ourselves.”381 This “judge not lest thee 
be judged”382 example makes much more sense than the example of lunch 
with Houston. 
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Twenty years later, Wechsler remained unrepentant. After rejecting 
all criticisms of his article as illegitimate,383 Wechsler reiterated his same 
freedom of association neutral principle: 
It really seems to me that the point on segregation is 
essentially that it’s a denial of liberty, and it’s a denial equally 
of the liberty of whites to associate with blacks, if those are 
the groups, and vice versa. . . . There isn’t anything in the 
paper that I regret or would do differently now.384 
Wechsler thus demonstrated that for all of his vaunted liberal sympathies, he 
remained ignorant of—if not complicit with (recall Wechsler’s response to 
Marshall in Allwright and his statement that he had to cooperate with ardent 
racists)385—the white subjugation of blacks. 
Perhaps the best response to Wechsler’s ridiculous false equivalence 
was his faculty colleague Charles Black’s suggestion that we exercise one of 
the “sovereign prerogatives of philosophers—that of laughter.”386 Black 
correctly observed that “[w]hen the directive of equality cannot be followed 
without displeasing the white, then something that can be called a ‘freedom’ 
of the white must be impaired.”387 As Kendall Thomas rightly recognized, 
Wechsler’s associational argument ignored the distinction between some 
whites who happen to be forced to interact with blacks in public having to 
put up with “some disagreeableness”388 and the freedom of those same whites 
not to interact with blacks “in the privacy of that white American’s home.”389 
Despite Wechsler’s demonstrated lack of self-awareness, his core 
argument that the rule of law must rely upon neutral principles that transcend 
the immediate result remains legal doctrine’s unavoidable end goal in a 
democracy.390 Transcendental reconstructionists continually ask, how can we 
perfect or improve the neutral principles (or lack thereof) we have in our 
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existing legal doctrine?391 Particular legal doctrine—like Jim Crow laws—is 
bad law because it fails to exhibit neutral principles.  
Four years after publishing Neutral Principles, in 1963, Wechsler 
successfully argued New York Times Co. v. Sullivan on behalf of the New 
York Times in front of the Supreme Court.392 In Sullivan, a Montgomery, 
Alabama police commissioner, Sullivan, sued the New York Times in 
calculated overreaction to a black civil rights fundraising advertisement in 
the Times that misrepresented some minor facts.393 Sullivan made it clear that 
citizens possessed a First Amendment right to criticize public officials.394 
Perhaps the Times reflected their continued gratitude for Wechsler’s 
exemplary advocacy when some 37 years later they called him a “Legal 
Giant.”395 
While Wechsler was finishing up Sullivan, he was asked to be the 
Executive Director of the ALI.396 Wechsler’s legal career thus shifted from 
legal practice attempting to improve legal doctrine incrementally to drafting 
model legal doctrine to encourage legal reform. 
B.         Master Doctrinalist 
Throughout his legal career, Wechsler proved a master of legal 
doctrine and a distinguished insider legal reformer. One of Wechsler’s “most 
important” articles of faith was a surprisingly positivist and formalist view of 
legal doctrine: “legal understanding is imperfectly attained, so long as law is 
treated as an independent discipline consisting sole[l]y of an ordering of rules 
and doctrines drawn from statutes and decisions.”397 He wrote treatises 
summarizing legal doctrine, a myriad of model rules to improve legal 
doctrine, and federal procedural rules to referee the federal doctrinal process. 
Chief Justice Warren Burger explained that Wechsler “has contributed broad 
perspective and constructive criticism, and his imprint is large on the fabric 
of our system of law.”398 
First, Wechsler authored two comprehensive treatises on legal 
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doctrine, Criminal Law and Its Administration (with Jerome Michael),399 and 
The Federal Courts and the Federal System (with fellow LPS founding father 
Henry M. Hart, Jr.).400 Criminal Law has been called “the template for all 
contemporary criminal law casebooks and perhaps the modern casebook 
more generally.”401 When Wechsler joined the Columbia Law faculty in 
1933, no course in criminal law was offered in the curriculum.402 Criminal 
Law described “a process from police investigation to executive clemency” 
by applying the “functional approach” to criminal law.403 Under that 
approach, Michael and Wechsler asked “what our purposes are and whether 
our means are well adapted to achieving those purposes.”404 
Akhil Amar called The Federal Courts “beautiful and brilliant—
probably the most important and influential casebook ever written.”405 The 
casebook has remained acclaimed over three editions and more than four 
decades.406 Chief Justice Warren Burger called The Federal Courts “an 
essential tool for the practicing bar.”407 
Second, Wechsler also was the chief reporter of the ALI’s Model 
Penal Code and ALI’s Executive Director for 21 years, from 1962 to 1984.408 
Chief Justice Burger characterized the ALI under Wechsler’s leadership as 
being “at the forefront of improvement in American law.”409 As Wechsler 
himself recognized, the ALI “has been engaged . . . in the restatement of the 
common law and in preparing model legislation” and in so doing “has had 
                                                 
399 MICHAEL & WECHSLER, supra note 54. 
400 The Legal Process School takes its name from the famous casebook, The Legal Process, 
a collection of class materials Hart and Albert Sacks used at Harvard Law School to teach 
generations of distinguished lawyers and U.S. Supreme Court Justices. See AMERICAN 
LEGAL THOUGHT supra note 300, at 318. 
401 Jonathan Simon, Wechsler’s Century and Ours: Reforming Criminal Law in a Time of 
Shifting Rationalities of Government, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 247, 248 (2003). 
402 Harold Edgar, In Memoriam: Herbert Wechsler and the Criminal Law: A Brief Tribute, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1347 (2000). 
403 Louis B. Schwartz, The Wechslerian Revolution in Criminal Law and Administration, 78 
COLUM. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (1978). 
404 Id.  
405 Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688 (1989) (book review). 
406 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hard and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 953, 958 (1994). 
407 Burger, supra note 32, at 951. 
408 AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT supra note 300, at 318. 
409 Burger, supra note 32, at 951. 
2018 USING THE MASTER’S TOOL 53 
enormous influence on the development of our law.”410 The ALI was founded 
in 1923 as a permanent organization “to promote the clarification and 
simplification of the law and its better adaption to social needs, to secure the 
better administration of justice, and to carry on scholarly and scientific legal 
work.”411 To accomplish this ambitious law reform mission, the ALI 
publishes Restatements of the Law summarizing the common law, model 
statutes, and commissioned law reform studies.412 
Under Wechsler’s directorship, the ALI shifted from a more passive 
reporting role to a more active law reform role.413 ALI’s First Restatement of 
Law was just that, a descriptive restatement of American common law “stated 
in the absence of a cleavage of authority and without assessment of the 
influence that such decisions would or should exert on a contemporary 
court.”414 The impetus of the change was the ALI’s approval of Section 402A 
of Torts Restatement (Second), which adopted a strict liability rule for “any 
product that is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer or his property.”415 In response, the Defense Research Institute 
(DRI) predictably criticized the ALI for adopting such a “minority” rule.416 
The DRI remains, in the words of its mission statement, “the largest 
international membership organization of attorneys defending the interests of 
business and individuals in civil litigation.”417 
In 1969, Wechsler decided to use the DRI’s criticism as a jumping off 
point to explore the fundamental law reform question of “how far a judgment 
as to what the law should be legitimately plays a part in reaching a decision 
as to what it is.”418 He believed that the DRI’s criticism exhibited “too simple 
an antithesis between an affirmation of what the law is and one as to what it 
ought to be.”419 Instead, Wechsler challenged a purely positivist conception 
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of legal doctrine: 
I asked, therefore, if the statement of a rule does not involve 
something more than the conclusion that it is supported by the 
past decisions, for this is an implicit judgment that our courts 
today would not perceive a change of situation calling for the 
adaptation of the rule or even for a new departure. And if we 
ask ourselves what courts will do in fact within an area, can 
we divorce our answers wholly from our view of what they 
ought to do, given the factors that appropriately influence their 
judgments, under the prevailing view of the judicial 
function?420 
Under Wechsler’s direction, the ALI ultimately decided to “declare 
the rule that an enlightened court faced with the question would announce”421 
in its subsequent Restatements of Law. To aid the ALI in its model 
rulemaking, Wechsler proposed “a working formula” that the ALI 
unanimously approved: “we should feel obligated in our deliberations to give 
weight to all of the considerations that the courts, under a proper view of the 
judicial function, deem it right to weigh in theirs.”422 
Wechsler recognized that this drafting change would permit “the 
Restatements to attempt to be what they have been and are in fact—a modest 
but essential aid in the improved analysis, clarification, unification, growth, 
and adaptation of the common law.”423 Reflecting his scrupulous 
unwillingness to inquire into motives or intentions,424 Wechsler was proud 
that the ALI never lobbied to have its recommendations actually adopted by 
lawmakers. Once their recommendations are published, the ALI’s role in law 
reform is finished. They let “interested individuals or organizations who care 
about the matter to do something about it.”425 
At ALI, Wechsler’s proudest achievement426 was the completion of 
the Model Penal Code (MPC).427 Sanford Kadish called Wechsler “a 
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towering figure who, more than anyone else, made the study of criminal law 
a respectable intellectual enterprise again” and “the latest in a tradition of 
Anglo-American criminal law codifiers going back to Jeremy Bentham.”428 
As the Code’s Reporter, Wechsler worked on the MPC from 1952 until the 
MPC was adopted in 1962.429 The MPC, by his own admission, “absorbed 
every bit of time and energy that [he] had.”430 
Finally, Wechsler helped draft the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and helped revise the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court.431 
He also was appointed to the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement 
and the Administration of Justice.432 
Although undoubtedly aware of Derrick Bell’s 1980 critique of his 
Neutral Principles article published in the same Harvard Law Review,433 
Wechsler remained defiantly unrepentant for the rest of his life.434 
Nevertheless, could anything or anyone make unconvinced white men like 
Wechsler change? Yes—their daughters.435  
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IV. TOWARD CRITICAL LEGAL PROCESS:  ERIKA WECHSLER AND WHITE 
CITIZENS FOR BLACK SURVIVAL 
Although there appears to be a great divide between Bell’s critical 
deconstruction436 and Wechsler’s transformative reconstruction437 of legal 
doctrine, Bell’s fictitious story involving Wechsler’s imaginary daughter 
suggests common ground.438 The enlightened, white lawyer–revolutionary 
Erika Wechsler, in Bell’s Faces at the Bottom of the Well,439 symbolizes 
Critical Legal Process’s goals. She represents the perhaps tongue-in-cheek 
hope for a remorseful Master, the dream that the powerful white majority 
might not only understand the permanence of racism but also do something 
about it. Like Critical Legal Process, Erika recognizes the danger of the rule 
of law and the need to go beyond theoretical discussions to concrete action, 
be it through legal process or revolution. 
A. The Story of the Remorseful Master. 
In the story, Bell visits an Oregon national park with a light lunch and 
his laptop computer to get some writing done amidst the beautiful trees.440 
While Bell sits on a log typing away at his laptop, a bullet ricochets nearby. 
The shooter, who apologizes for the near miss, is “a sturdy white woman, 
probably in her mid-thirties . . . dressed in camouflage battle fatigues and . . 
. a long-billed baseball cap over disheveled blonde hair” carrying a 
semiautomatic rifle.441 She introduces herself as Erika Wechsler and politely 
asks if she can join Bell.442 
Erika immediately identifies Bell as “one of those civil-rights-lawyer 
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types who believe it’s enough to rely on law to secure rights for [oppressed] 
people”443 like her father Professor Wechsler: 
My father was a law professor. You talk like he did. And it’s 
obvious you’re as compulsive as he was, coming all the way 
out here to work when any sensible person would be simply 
enjoying the scenery. Plus, your folders read ‘Constitutional 
Law class notes and Civil Rights seminar.’ I mean, how many 
clues do I need?444 
It turns out that Erika completed law school “for [her] father’s sake” even 
though she “hated every minute” of law school and law practice as well.445 
However, she remains “fascinated by law.”446 
Surprised, Bell admits that he used to be a liberal law professor like 
Wechsler: “Yes, that’s what I was—once. For years I believed law was the 
answer, and I still teach law, including civil rights law.”447 He goes on to 
explain his transition to Critical Race Theory: “Now, though, I’m convinced 
that racism is a permanent part of the American landscape.”448 Bell then 
emphasizes the rule of law’s continuing mythological power among 
lawmakers and the public, pointing out that “as soon as [he] express[es] the 
view that racism cannot be vanquished by the enactment and enforcement of 
strong civil rights laws, most people conclude that [he has] given up, or 
surrendered, or, worse, sold out.”449 
Presciently, Erika identifies one of the key areas of disagreement 
between Crits and liberal law reformers: tangible concrete action. Erika 
responds: “But, Professor, you’re always dealing with theories and 
abstractions. Many of the civil rights veterans you upset are committed 
to the tangible, to what they see as real—including, paradoxically 
enough, traditional symbols like racial justice, equal opportunity, even 
integration.”450 
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After further conversation, it is clear that Erika wholeheartedly agrees 
with all of Bell’s scholarship and theory.451 Erika then tells Bell that her 
“work could prove of great help” to him.452 She helped found “White Citizens 
for Black Survival” (WCBS).453 WCBS’s program has two prongs. First, a 
“racial realism” policy that largely parallels Bell’s pessimistic view of 
racism’s permanence.454 Second, an “activist phase, in which we aim to build 
a nationwide network of secret shelters to house and feed black people in the 
event of a black holocaust or some other all-out attack on America’s historic 
scapegoats.”455 Erika’s WCBS essentially embodies the remorseful Master: 
[WCBS is] a collective of whites dedicated to doing what we 
can to shield blacks from the worst dangers of racism. . . . To 
last in WBCS, one must try to be as sensitive to racial 
subordination as a member of the oppressor class can be: 
aware of what went on in the past beyond history’s received 
truths, and cognizant of the fact that slavery, for example, tried 
to dehumanize blacks, and failed, and didn’t try to 
dehumanize whites, but succeeded. 
. . . 
We . . . are determined to avoid in ourselves the oppressor’s 
penalty. We try to understand contemporary racism and the 
role it plays in American law, because law has always been a 
powerful expression of ruling interests. We believe that 
America’s race problem is a white problem. We have 
determined to take personal responsibility.456 
Erika recognizes that both classic liberals and Crits deny reality.457 
“Advocates of liberal civil rights theory,” like her father, Herbert Wechsler, 
“tend to deny [the] reality” of discrimination around them for fictions in legal 
doctrine.458 Because she is a lawyer and Herbert Wechsler’s daughter, Erika 
understands the rule of law and legal doctrine. She recognizes that her law 
degree “gives [her] protection against” legal fictions like the rule of law’s 
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objectivity.459 
Many critical theorists like Bell, however, remain academic and 
refuse to take their theories’ logic to their natural, practical conclusions.460 
As Erika explains to Bell 
New ideas always stir resistance. Look at your reaction to 
WCBS’s mission to help black refugees in case of a general 
racial attack. You think I’m crazy. I see it in your eyes, and 
yet your view, that oppression on the basis of race is 
permanent, renders such an attack not only possible, but 
probable.461 
To which Bell replies: “Which is why so many people reject it.”462 
The supernaturally wise Geneva Crenshaw later admonishes Bell: “I 
hope you took Erika’s message seriously. For all the reasons you have been 
describing, black people may need places of refuge and whites to provide 
escape from future betrayals.”463 To which Bell responds: “Even if I knew 
for a certainty that whites planned another massive betrayal of blacks, most 
whites—and some blacks—would not believe me.”464 
B.         Critical of the Rule of Law. 
Like Critical Legal Process, Erika remains highly skeptical of the rule 
of law while understanding how legal doctrine is created and reformed. Her 
insider knowledge of law, as both a lawyer and a liberal law professor’s 
daughter, helps her understand how the Master’s favorite tool was used to 
build his house. By her own admission, such understanding helps her cut 
through legal fictions and get lawmakers to “straighten right up and talk 
sense.”465 
Immediately before his Erika Wechsler account,466 Bell placed 
another story about a black man; a story, the immortal Geneva Crenshaw told 
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Bell, in which the character was purposefully related to Erika’s story.467 This 
story introduced the so-called Last Black Hero. Like Erika, the Last Black 
Hero was also a lawyer, “worked in civil rights law for a few years” but 
“became frustrated with the law’s proclivity for preserving the status quo 
even at the cost of continuing inequities for black people,” and abandoned 
hope in the rule of law.468 He “realize[d]—unlike most of [his] civil rights 
lawyer friends—that activism more than legal precedent is the key to racial 
reform.” The Last Black Hero concluded: “You can’t just talk about, meet 
about, and pray about racial discrimination. You have to confront it, 
challenge it, do battle” with it.469 
Although Bell’s Last Black Hero and Erika Weschler both understood 
the Master’s favorite tool and the Master’s house, unlike the Last Black Hero, 
as a member of WCBS, Erika is the Master. Erika and her WCBS agreed with 
the Last Black Hero’s admonition to confront, challenge, and do battle with 
inequality and injustice. Erika, WCBS, the Last Black Hero, and—by 
inference—Bell all appeared to turn Thurgood Marshall’s earlier 
admonition470 on its head, to save their protesting for the real world and not 
the courtroom. 
C.         Action through the Legal Process not Revolution. 
Critical Legal Process echoes Erika Wechsler and the Last Black 
Hero’s desire for concrete action. Concrete action, of course, is not 
necessary.471 The common complaint lodged against critical legal movements 
as nihilistic is unfounded.472 Before you can resolve a problem, you have to 
know that the problem exists. Identifying a problem without offering any 
concrete solutions remains a genuine scholarly contribution. 
However, Bell appears to disagree. He prefaces his Erika Wechsler 
story with a quote from the Book of James in the Bible: “For as the body 
without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also.”473 Mere faith 
in critical theory thus would appear to be insufficient to Bell. One must live 
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that faith through concrete action. 
If, however, we take critical legal movements’ pessimistic 
assumptions about the Master’s oppression474 seriously, then ironically, the 
only viable alternative for concrete action is the rule of law. Critical Legal 
Process thus literally or figuratively focuses on using the Master’s favorite 
tool to dismantle his house. 
Because they agree with Lorde that the Master’s favorite tool, the rule 
of law, can never be used to dismantle his house of legal doctrine,475 Erika 
and the Last Black Hero choose to act through potentially violent 
revolution.476 If the Master’s oppression is so entrenched and permanent as 
Bell argues,477 then nonviolent protest, which relies upon changing public 
opinion and the Master’s heart, would be futile. 
As Erika and the Last Black Hero both concede, the problem with 
violent revolution is that the permanent structural power disparities that 
multiple critical legal movements take for granted,478 by their own admission, 
doom their violent revolution to failure as well. As the Last Black Hero 
explained: “Universal black militance would end black people. Whites could 
not stand it.”479 In fact, Bell’s Last Black Hero conceded that his black 
militancy was nearly suicidal: 
Militant black leadership is like being on a bomb squad. It 
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requires confidence in your skills and a courage able to 
survive the continuing awareness that you’re messing with 
dynamite, but that someone has to do it. One mistake, and 
you’re gone! Sometimes you’re gone whether or not you make 
a mistake.480 
At the end of the day, the more radical and pessimistic core 
assumptions at the heart of critical legal movements such as Bell’s Racial 
Realism481 are just that: unprovable assumptions.482 They are unprovable 
because there are simply too many variables to test their veracity. For 
example, you either believe, along with Bell and Critical Race Theorists, that 
U.S. racism is structurally permanent and impervious to legal reform, or, 
along with Wechsler and civil rights advocates, that U.S. racism, while still 
present in modern American society, can be lessened through the rule of law. 
In the final analysis, core assumptions like the permanence or impermanence 
of racism are more about faith than reason or evidence. 
As Bell recognized with his critical deconstruction of legal 
doctrine,483 for better or worse, many lawmakers and practicing attorneys in 
a democracy believe that legal doctrine is the only “real” form of law.484 They 
unfairly reject critical theoretical legal scholarship as useless.485 Even if they 
refuse to accept critically deconstructed hypothetical legal doctrine seriously 
as workable alternatives, they can nevertheless better understand critical legal 
theoretical concepts when “translated” into legal doctrine. 
Just as identifying the problem is the necessary prerequisite to solving 
the problem, Bell’s critical deconstruction of legal doctrine is the necessary 
prerequisite to Wechsler’s transformative reconstruction of legal doctrine. 
Above all, Critical Legal Process’s willingness to use legal doctrine 
symbolically and practically allows people who run the ideological gamut, 
from well-intentioned but hesitant incremental law reformers to radical 
critical legal theorists disdainful of the rule of law, to work together to 
improve the lives of oppressed groups. 
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CONCLUSION 
In another story, The Ultimate Civil Rights Strategy, Bell 
acknowledged that the Master’s tool, the rule of law, might be repurposed in 
a third way to dismantle the Master’s house.486 The Celestial Curia Sisters, 
immortals who resemble the Greek Muses,487 left open the hope that this third 
way might work: 
“My Curia Sisters,” Geneva [Crenshaw] said, “I . . . confess[] 
confusion. You warn us that our legal programs are 
foredoomed to failure, and yet you urge us to continue those 
very programs because they will create an atmosphere of 
protest. I must reiterate my fear that this approach will simply 
perpetuate the pattern of benefit to whites of legal reforms 
achieved by civil rights litigation intended to help blacks.” 
[The Curia responded,] “The benefit they bring to all is 
proof of how potent a weapon your civil rights programs can 
be in seeking a restructured society. Future campaigns, while 
seeking relief in traditional forms, should emphasize the 
chasm between the existing social order and the nation’s 
ideals. Thus, Sister Geneva, litigation as well as protests and 
political efforts would pursue reform directly as well as create 
a continuing tension between what you are and what you 
might become. Out of this tension may come the insight and 
imagination necessary to recast the nation’s guiding principles 
closer to the ideal—for all Americans.”488 
Tension understandably leaves us uncomfortable. We crave 
certainty. Yet with sharply divisive legal and policy issues like race, 
tension is what helps us escape our confirmation bias echo chamber and 
make better—dare we say—more objective decisions.489 
Critical Legal Process seeks to embrace the continuing tension the 
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Curia identified—between our ideals and our reality—to find a third way 
to improve legal doctrine. In this sense, Critical Legal Process, like both 
Bell and Wechsler, cares more about the struggle, the journey, and the 
process than the eventual destination or outcome. 
In their own way, both Bell and Wechsler admitted that their tasks 
ultimately were impossible. In light of the overwhelming power disparity and 
structural permanence of racism, real racial progress seemed impossible to 
Bell.490 Although Wechsler believed that legal doctrinal reform could limit 
racism, Wechsler also agreed that perfect legal doctrine was impossible.491 
Wechsler probably would also concede that it is impossible to eradicate 
racism. 
Both Bell and Wechsler found meaning and significance in—as 
American realist Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated—wearing your 
heart out in pursuit of the unattainable.492 Wechsler’s famous Neutral 
Principles address, to which Bell responded, was dedicated to Justice 
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Holmes.493 Wechsler called himself a “jobbist . . . [c]oncerned with 
competence and . . . intellectual integrity in thinking about law and working 
about law.”494 Holmes explained about his “imaginary society of jobbists” 
that “[t]heir job is their contribution to the general welfare and when a man 
is on that, he will do it better the less he thinks either of himself or his 
neighbors, and the more he puts all his energy into the problem he has to 
solve.”495 
For all their considerable ideological disagreement, Bell probably 
would agree with Wechsler that he too was a jobbist. When it comes to our 
continuing “American Dilemma”496 of race relations and remediation of past 
discrimination, we all need to be jobbists. 
Although Bell and Wechsler disagreed over the content of Brown’s 
neutral principle,497 both were undoubtedly courageous people. Perhaps 
Wechsler’s truly neutral principles of law and Bell’s definition of courage 
share an overlapping vision. Bell defined courage as “a decision you make to 
act in a way that works through your own fear for the greater good as opposed 
to pure self-interest. Courage means putting at risk your immediate self-
interest for what you believe is right.”498 Despite his cynicism, Bell 
acknowledged that people still respected courage and principle: 
I think that there is, even in our bottom-line society—you 
know, take care of number one . . . there is a real respect and 
a regard for individuals who are willing to act on principle, 
whether it turns out to be right or . . . wrong or misguided.499 
To Wechsler, a truly neutral principle of law would satisfy Bell’s 
definition of courage. Eschewing outcome-determinative self-interest 
for the greater good of principled legal doctrine makes for the 
courageous rule of law. 
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We need the courageous rule of law. Perhaps, like Audre Lorde 
claimed, the Master’s tool will never dismantle his house.500 Perhaps the 
rule of law will provide only temporary relief but never genuine change. 
Only time will tell. In the meantime, we can find solace in Derrick Bell’s 
wise words: “[W]e must not forget that it is our duty to keep looking for 
an answer, realizing that we may never find it. Our salvation is not in the 
discovery, but in the search.”501 
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